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ABSTRACT 
For the past decade, the learned intermediary rule—the rule of tort law 
that provides that drug manufacturers may satisfy their duty to warn of a 
drug’s dangers by warning the prescribing physician rather than the end user 
of the drug—has been the subject of vigorous academic debate.  That debate 
has been largely moot, however, as the courts have proven reluctant to make 
significant inroads on the protection offered by the Rule to drug 
manufacturers.  This Article proposes a new approach to the Rule.  Part I 
discusses the history and overwhelming adoption of the Rule pursuant to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Part II argues that changes in the health care 
delivery system have resulted in a legal system that introduces market 
distortions by effectively immunizing the pharmaceutical industry from the 
legal and social consequences of its own actions.  Part III then sets forth a 
reconceptualization of the Rule, which preserves the Rule’s benefits with respect 
to the drug industry, the health care system, and the goals of tort law, while 
also strengthening the protection the tort system offers to individuals injured by 
prescription drugs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As this Article is being written, the fortieth anniversary of the 
learned intermediary rule1—the rule of tort law which provides that 
drug manufacturers may satisfy their duty to warn of a drug’s dangers 
by warning the prescribing physician rather than the end user of the 
drug—is two years away.  In 1966, when the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit coined the term “learned intermediary 
rule” in the case of Sterling Drug v. Cornish,2 President Lyndon 
Johnson was in the White House3 and Dr. Kildare was on television.4  
Dr. Kildare, like Marcus Welby, who followed him,5 remains an icon 
of the traditional American health care system: a primary care 
physician devoted to his patients.  A vast literature chronicles the 
change (some would say the decline) from the fee-for-service health 
care system of that time with its emphasis on the dyadic, paternalistic 
physician–patient relationship, to the modern, twenty-first century 
health care system with its triadic managed care relationships and 
uncertain authority structure.6  Strangely, in the face of these 
revolutionary changes in medical practice, as well as a substantial 
critical scholarly literature, the learned intermediary rule as applied 
by courts has remained virtually unchanged from its first articulation 
in 1966 until the present day.  Simply stated, and subject to a few 
 
 1 References to “the Rule” in this Article, unless otherwise specified, are to the 
learned intermediary rule. 
 2 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).  Although the phrase “learned intermediary 
rule” was coined by the Sterling Drug court, the concepts behind the Rule predate its 
naming.  See, e.g., Magee v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 322, 350-51 (Ct. App. 
1963). 
 3 THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, at  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/index2.html (last visited Aug. 25, 
2004). 
 4 TIM BROOKS & EARLE MARSH, THE COMPLETE DIRECTORY TO PRIME TIME 
NETWORK AND CABLE TELEVISION SHOWS: 1946-PRESENT 268 (7th ed. 1999). 
 5 Dr. Kildare was broadcast from 1961 to 1966.  Id.  Marcus Welby, M.D., 
premiered in 1969 and ran until 1976.  Id. at 627-28. 
 6 See generally PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN 
THE MANAGED CARE ERA  (2002); E. HAAVI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW 
MEDICAL ETHICS OF MEDICINE’S NEW ECONOMICS  (1995); Carl F. Ameringer, Devolution 
and Distrust: Managed Care and the Resurgence of Physician Power and Authority, 5 DEPAUL 
J. HEALTH CARE L. 187, 187-93 (2002); Dionne Koller Fine, Physician Liability and 
Managed Care: A Philosophical Perspective, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 641, 644-53 (2003); 
Joseph Gottfried & Frank A. Sloan, The Quality of Managed Care: Evidence from the 
Medical Literature, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 103-29 (2002); Thomas L. 
Greaney, From Hero to Goat: Managed Care in the 1990s, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 217, 217-19 
(2003); Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It, 
51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 462-64 (2003); Daniel P. Maher, Managed Care and Undividing 
Loyalties, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 703, 703-05 (2002). 
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narrowly applied exceptions, the mere fact that a prescription drug is 
at issue7 in a failure-to-warn tort case automatically vitiates the 
manufacturer’s duty to warn the end user of dangers posed by the 
product.  Courts almost unanimously apply a virtually irrebuttable 
presumption that the end user’s physician is the only appropriate 
source for warnings of a drug’s potential dangers.  As Part II of this 
Article will show, the current state of the American health care system 
no longer permits such an unreflective assumption. 
This Article proposes a reworking of failure-to-warn doctrine and 
the learned intermediary rule more suited to the changed health care 
marketplace faced today by patients, physicians, pharmacists, and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.  In the twenty-first century American 
managed health care system, patients receive far less personalized 
attention from their physicians, and are seen by a greater variety and 
diversity of physicians, than in the past.  The average length of an 
office visit is shorter under aggressive managed care cost containment 
structures,8 providing less time for personal interaction and fewer 
opportunities for physicians to educate and inform their patients.  
Additionally, managed care organizations (“MCOs”) increasingly 
exert control over the doctor–patient relationship, including the 
choice of prescription drugs, through the use of pre-authorization 
requirements, formularies, and pharmacy benefit managers.9 
At the same time, the opportunities for successful medical 
treatment, including pharmacological treatment, are more extensive 
 
 7 Although the learned intermediary rule has been applied to medical devices as 
well as prescription drugs, see, e.g., Johnson v. Zimmer, Inc., No. Civ. 02-1328, 2004 
WL 742038, at *9-10 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2004) (prosthetic femoral hip stem); 
McCombs v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 587 S.E.2d 594, 594-96 (Ga. 2003) (spinal plate); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (1997) [hereinafter 
THIRD RESTATEMENT], this Article will focus on the Rule in the prescription drug 
context.  The process of development, approval, promotion, and sale of medical 
devices is materially different from that of prescription drugs, and analysis of whether 
a conclusive presumption of a learned intermediary is appropriate in the medical 
device context is reserved for another day. 
 8 R. Balkrishman et al., Capitation Payment, Length of Visit and Preventive Services: 
Evidence from a National Sample of Outpatient Physicians, 8 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 332, 
337 (2002); Peifeng Hu & David B. Reuben, Effects of Managed Care on the Length of 
Time That Elderly Patients Spend with Physicians During Ambulatory Visits, 40 MED. CARE 
606, 610-12 (2002).  Both of these articles point out that the length of office visits 
appears to be more closely related to the type of reimbursement than the type of 
insurance.  For a report reaching the opposite conclusion, that managed care does 
not seem to have altered the length of office visits, see David Mechanic et al., Are 
Patients’ Office Visits with Physicians Getting Shorter?, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198, 201-03 
(2001). 
 9 For a discussion of the rise of managed care’s control over the distribution of 
prescription drugs, see Sharlow Johnson, PBMs: Ripe for Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 323, 328-31 (2002). 
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than they have ever been, and drug manufacturers’ research and 
development budgets have increased commensurately.  In addition to 
medically necessary drugs, drug manufacturers have increasingly 
turned their attention to producing therapies for conditions that 
would not have been considered suitable candidates for medical 
intervention forty years ago.  Products such as Viagra, Rogaine, 
Botox, and others10 have proven to be lucrative products for their 
manufacturers, despite the sometimes questionable necessity for 
these so-called “lifestyle” drugs. 
Finally, the modern medical marketplace focuses on the patient 
as consumer to an extent unimaginable forty years ago.  In 1966, the 
paternalistic relationship between doctor and patient precluded any 
direct communication between the manufacturer of a drug and end 
users of that drug.  Opportunities to learn about available treatments, 
except from one’s physician in the context of a face-to-face 
consultation, were virtually nonexistent.11  Today, by contrast, the 
Internet supplies voluminous information on virtually every drug and 
alternative therapy on demand to one’s desktop or living room.12  In 
addition to this wealth of information available for the asking, 
pharmaceutical products are routinely touted in television, print, and 
Internet advertisements.  Direct-to-consumer advertising occupies an 
ever-growing percentage of drug companies’ vast promotional 
budgets, and studies show that such advertisements are effective in 
creating demand for specific brand-name drugs.13  With the advent of 
Internet-based pharmacies, it is even possible (though illegal)14 for 
 
 10 Such pharmaceuticals developed and marketed primarily for their cosmetic 
effects, rather than for the treatment of a traditional medical “illness,” will be 
referred to in this Article as “lifestyle” drugs.  For a discussion of the difficulty of 
definitively classifying a particular drug as a “lifestyle” drug, see infra Part II.A.3. 
 11 The only prescription pharmaceutical advertisements undertaken by drug 
companies in the 1960s were targeted directly to physicians or other health care 
professionals through medical and other industry journals unlikely to be accessible 
to the average patient. See infra notes 193–95 and accompanying text. 
 12 Studies consistently show a large percentage of American Internet users search 
for health information online, and several companies have started high-profile 
Internet medical information resource websites.  See, e.g., http://www.drkoop.com 
(last visited Aug. 27, 2004); http://www.webmd.com (last visited Aug. 27, 2004). 
 13 See, e.g., Simon Gilbody et al., Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Psychotropics: An 
Emerging and Evolving Form of Pharmaceutical Company Influence, 185 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1, 1-2 (2004); Barbara Mintzes et al., How Does Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTCA) 
Affect Prescribing?  A Survey in Primary Care Environments with and without Legal DTCA, 
169 CAN. MED. ASS’N. J. 405, 408-09 (2003); Elizabeth Murray et al., Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising: Physicians’ Views of Its Effects on Quality of Care and the Doctor–Patient 
Relationship, 16 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 513, 513-24 (2003). 
 14 For an excellent discussion of the legal limits on Internet pharmacies and the 
extent to which existing Internet pharmacies disregard or operate beyond the reach 
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consumers to purchase prescription drugs in the absence of a 
meaningful physician–patient relationship; indeed, without any 
contact with a licensed physician.15  Doctors Welby and Kildare would 
be shocked and bewildered by the sheer volume and diversity of 
information and alternatives available to today’s patients.16 
This Article surveys these and other changes in the health care 
marketplace in the past forty years and critically examines the 
continued vitality of the learned intermediary rule in light of these 
changes.  I conclude that the learned intermediary rule in its current 
form does not adequately reflect the realities of the modern health 
care system and I propose reworking the Rule to better regulate 
today’s pharmaceutical marketplace and better accomplish the main 
goals of tort law: compensation, deterrence, and cost allocation.17 
The diversity of the modern health care system, recent changes 
in the development and marketing of prescription drugs, and the 
increased ethical emphasis on the autonomy and responsibility of the 
patient lead to the conclusion that the learned intermediary rule 
should no longer be applied as a bright-line exception for 
prescription drugs in modern failure-to-warn jurisprudence.  Rather, 
courts should undertake a fact-based inquiry to determine whether 
the drug in question was in fact sold in the absence of an effective 
intermediary.  The focus should not be on the type of product being 
sold, but rather on the quality of the doctor–patient interaction that 
results in the prescription and use of the drug. 
In fact, tort law already uses such a rule, but not in the 
prescription drug context.  Manufacturers selling products other 
than drugs through intermediaries have also argued that the duty to 
warn the ultimate user of the product should be delegable to the 
intermediary and, in appropriate cases, courts have been willing to 
allow manufacturers to satisfy their duty to warn by simply warning an 
intermediary.  The major difference between this “sophisticated user 
doctrine” and the learned intermediary rule is the level of analysis 
that courts are willing to undertake to determine whether delegation 
of the duty to warn to an intermediary is appropriate. 
Part I of this Article begins with a brief history and description of 
the learned intermediary rule as currently applied.  Part II then 
 
of those legal limits, see John Blum, Internet Medicine and the Evolving Legal Status of the 
Physician–Patient Relationship, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 413, 439-48 (2003). 
 15 See id.; see also infra Part II.A.4. 
 16 Cf. Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1246 (N.J. 1999) (“Our medical-
legal jurisprudence is based on images of health care that no longer exist.”). 
 17 Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 
772, 772 (1985). 
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surveys the ways in which the Rule as it exists fails to reflect modern 
medical practice, pharmaceutical marketing, and medical ethics.  
Part III concludes that the Rule should, rather than merely being 
abrogated for some or all categories of drug sales, be reformed to 
reflect the fact that in today’s health care delivery environment, not 
all prescription drug sales occur in the presence and with the 
assistance and protection of an effective learned intermediary.  I 
propose changes in the application of the learned intermediary rule 
to bring the law’s presumptions into line with the modern health care 
marketplace and to provide an incentive to drug manufacturers and 
the health care delivery system to improve the lines of 
communication between health care providers and patients. 
I. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE 
Prescription drugs have long held a special place in American 
products liability law, having been singled out as “unavoidably 
unsafe” by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.18  The law has struggled 
with the proper balance between the interests of individuals harmed 
by unavoidably unsafe products19 and the interest of society in 
encouraging the development and marketing of innovative 
pharmaceutical products in the face of the undeniable risk posed by 
those products.20  The standard formula of strict products liability is 
widely, and correctly, regarded as unworkable in the prescription 
 
 18 Comment k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states in relevant 
part: 
There are some products which, in the present state of human 
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended 
and ordinary use.  These are especially common in the field of 
drugs. . . .  [B]oth the marketing and the use of [prescription drugs] 
are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk 
which they involve.  Such a product, properly prepared, and 
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is 
it unreasonably dangerous. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) [hereinafter SECOND 
RESTATEMENT]. 
 19 Although eager plaintiffs’ attorneys occasionally forget, injury is a prerequisite 
to maintenance of an action for failure to warn.  See Heindel v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. 
02-3348, 2004 WL 1398024, at *1 (D.N.J. June 7, 2004) (granting defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment where plaintiffs alleged no actual injury from taking 
prescription drugs, but only claimed “‘economic injuries’ they suffered due to 
[d]efendants’ failure to publicize the results of two clinical studies that revealed 
possible risks associated with the use of the drugs”). 
 20 See generally Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1195-96 (Alaska 1992); 
Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 339-40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Bennett v. Madakasira, 
821 So. 2d 794, 809 (Miss. 2002); Pollard v. Ashby, 793 S.W.2d 394, 399-400 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1990); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 304 A.2d 562, 563-65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1973); Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Pa. 1991). 
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drug context21 because of the uncertainty and complexity attendant 
on medical treatment and the possibility that strict tort liability might 
chill research and development of new pharmaceutical products.  
The precise parameters of the law’s treatment of these products, 
however, are no longer adequately calibrated to give effect to the 
purposes behind tort law. 
A. Safe Harbor for Manufacturers 
According to the principles of strict liability, the predominant 
American products liability doctrine,22 a manufacturer or seller of a 
defective product is liable to the product’s end user for injuries 
caused by that product without regard to whether the manufacturer 
or seller was negligent in the manufacture or sale of the product.23  
The drafters of the Second Restatement, however, noted a different rule 
for “[u]navoidably unsafe” products.24  Imposition of strict liability for 
injuries caused by such products would impair an industry’s ability to 
market a socially desirable product and would deprive society of the 
benefit of that product.25  Therefore, injury resulting from the use of 
these products generates tort liability for manufacturers only when 
the products are “unreasonably dangerous.”26  Generally speaking, 
unavoidably unsafe products are unreasonably dangerous when the 
end user of the product does not know of, or has no reason to know 
of, the dangers presented by the product and so is unable to take 
 
 21 See, e.g., Hahn v. Richter, 673 A.2d 888, 889-90 (Pa. 1996); T. Leigh Anenson, 
Great Expectations: The Role of the Consumer in Determining Effective Design, 38 TORT TRIAL 
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 963, 986 (2003).  Not all courts recognize this, however.  See Foister 
v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 705 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (“As this action 
involves a dangerous prescription drug, it is governed by the rules of strict liability.”). 
 22 See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 1 cmt. a  (describing the historic 
growth of strict products liability as “a discrete area of tort law which borrows from 
both negligence and warranty”). 
 23 Section 402A of the Second Restatement states: “One who sells any product in a 
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer . . . is subject to 
liability . . . although . . . the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation 
and sale of his product . . . .”  SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 402A.  This 
principle of strict liability is reaffirmed in the Third Restatement, which provides: 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing 
products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to 
liability for harm . . . caused by the defect. . . .  A product . . . contains a 
manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended 
design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation 
and marketing of the product . . . . 
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 1-2. 
 24 SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 402A cmt. k. 
 25 See id. 
 26 See id. § 402A cmt. i. 
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these dangers into account when making the decision whether to use 
the product by balancing its expected benefits against its potential 
harms.27  Thus, manufacturers can avoid liability arising out of the use 
of unavoidably unsafe products by distributing them with legally 
adequate warnings and instructions for use.  The analysis applicable 
to unavoidably unsafe products, therefore, carries within it a 
negligence-based reasonableness inquiry.28 
The category of unavoidably unsafe products, as the drafters of 
the Second Restatement recognized, encompasses the vast majority of, if 
not all, prescription drugs.29  All drugs present potential dangers in 
addition to their touted benefits.30  Although the manufacturer need 
not explicitly warn against obvious dangers,31 potential drug 
interactions and side effects are not the sorts of dangers that are 
obvious upon inspection of the product.  Therefore, both 
instructions as to the correct use of the product and warnings as to 
the potential consequences of both proper and improper use are 
necessary.32 
 
 27 Id.  This analysis mirrors the doctrine of informed consent, in which 
knowledge of and assent to risk eliminates liability for harms resulting from that risk, 
and thus demonstrates respect for the autonomy of the patient.  Of course, under 
standard principles of informed consent, a physician can be held liable for failing to 
transmit adequate warnings to the patient.  See Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2002-SC-
0746-CL, 2004 WL 1361954, at *9-10 (Ky. June 17, 2004).  This theory of liability, 
while providing another source of remedy for the patient injured by a prescription 
drug, is largely beyond the scope of this Article. 
 28 See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 1 cmt. a (noting that although “many 
courts insist on speaking of [failure-to-warn and defective design liability] as being 
‘strict,’” those theories of liability actually “rely on a reasonableness test traditionally 
used in determining whether an actor has been negligent”).  Prescription drug 
litigation is virtually never conducted on a defective design theory.  Id. § 6(c) & cmt. 
b (discussing the “traditional refusal by courts to impose tort liability for defective 
designs of prescription drugs”). 
 29 SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 402A cmt. k. 
 30 See infra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing the over-the-counter drug 
market). 
 31 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 331 n.70 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(observing that “a product seller is not liable for failure to warn of risks ‘that should 
be obvious to, or generally known by, foreseeable product users’”) (quoting THIRD 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 2 cmt. j.). 
 32 The distinction between instructions and warnings is well-developed in the 
products liability literature.  See, e.g., Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 
N.E.2d 155, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that Indiana law requires manufacturer 
to provide both adequate instructions for proper use of product and warnings of 
dangers from improper use); see also THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 1 cmt. a 
(discussing history of products liability as it relates to use of “instructions or 
warnings”).  Following the convention in the literature, however, references to 
“warnings” in this Article should be read to refer to both warnings and instructions 
unless otherwise specified. 
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Since warnings and instructions are necessary to enable the 
reasonably safe use of prescription drugs, and to allow the 
manufacturer to avoid liability for those injuries that will unavoidably 
occur from the use of the product, the manufacturer must determine 
how to satisfy its legal duty to warn and instruct.  Discharge of this 
duty has two facets: the content of the warning and the means of 
communicating the warning.  In this, the drug manufacturer has a 
decided advantage over manufacturers of other unavoidably unsafe 
products.  Ordinarily, a legally effective warning must be reasonably 
designed to capture the attention of the end user of the product.  An 
otherwise unobjectionable warning which is diluted by overly 
favorable descriptions of the product,33 not communicated in an 
efficient manner,34 or hidden from clear view35 is of no use to the 
consumer and cannot be relied on as a shield against liability. 
In stark contrast to this ordinary rule of tort law, an adequate 
warning of the dangers of a prescription drug need not be 
communicated to the end user at all, but only to the prescribing 
physician.  The prescribing physician, so the theory goes, acts as a 
“learned intermediary” between the end user and the drug 
manufacturer.  She is an “intermediary” because a prescription drug 
cannot be legally obtained without a prescription from a licensed 
physician.36  She is “learned” because of the extensive medical 
 
 33 For cases recognizing that a warning could be nullified by “overpromotion” of 
the product, which had the effect of diluting the warning’s effectiveness, see, e.g., 
Salmon v. Parke Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975) (interpreting 
North Carolina law); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973); 
Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Baldino v. 
Castagna, 478 A.2d 807, 810 (Pa. 1984). 
 34 For cases finding that a warning not adequately communicated to prescribing 
physicians is not legally effective, see, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 
652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981) (interpreting New Hampshire law); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. 
Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 421 
N.Y.S.2d 81, 85-86 (App. Div. 1979). 
 35 Wright ex rel. Trust Co. of Kan. v. Abbott Labs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1201 (D. 
Kan. 1999) (finding a warning adequate because, inter alia, it was “not concealed or 
hidden on some remote part of a large piece of machinery . . . [but] clearly 
emblazoned on the package label and repeatedly stated on the package insert”). 
 36 Restrictions on the legal sale of prescription drugs are contained in the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetics Act.  Specifically, 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) provides that drugs, which 
are approved by the FDA as prescription drugs: 
shall be dispensed only (i) upon a written prescription of a practitioner 
licensed by law to administer such drug, or (ii) upon an oral 
prescription of such practitioner which is reduced promptly to writing 
and filed by the pharmacist, or (iii) by refilling any such written or oral 
prescription if such refilling is authorized by the prescriber either in 
the original prescription or by oral order which is reduced promptly to 
writing and filed by the pharmacist. 
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training that enables her to comprehend the content of a complete 
and necessarily technical and complex warning about the drug.  
Training and experience allow the physician to translate the 
technical details concerning the potential therapeutic benefits and 
known risks of the drug into specific recommendations and 
instructions for use by the individual patient.  In the absence of 
either of these factors, the Rule should not apply.37 
The first mention of the learned intermediary rule by that name 
occurred in 1966 in the case of Sterling Drug v. Cornish.38  From that 
beginning, the Rule was quickly and widely adopted by state and 
federal courts.39  In Sterling Drug, the plaintiff alleged that a warning 
given to her physician by the drug manufacturer was inadequate 
because it did not disclose a known, although rare, side effect of the 
drug prescribed for her.40  The Sterling Drug court distinguished 
prescription drugs from “normal consumer item[s],”41 holding that 
the law required a warning to the prescribing physician, but the court 
gave no rationale for an accompanying exemption from the duty to 
warn the consumer directly.42 
Moreover, comment k to section 402A of the Second Restatement 
 
21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (2000). 
 37 This is an application of the familiar legal maxim of cessante ratione legis cessat et 
ipsa lex, translated as,  “Where the reason for the rule ceases, there the law itself also 
ceases.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY app. B at 1708 (8th ed. 2004).  As will be shown in 
Part I.C, infra, however, courts have not heeded this rule of construction in the 
prescription drug context. 
 38 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).  The Sterling Drug court stated: “In [a 
prescription drug] case the purchaser’s doctor is a learned intermediary between the 
purchaser and the manufacturer.  If the doctor is properly warned of the possibility 
of a side effect in some patients, and is advised of the symptoms . . . there is an 
excellent chance that injury to the patient can be avoided.”  Id.  The court made this 
statement in the context of distinguishing the case at bar, in which plaintiff suffered 
a known but rare side effect, from cases holding that a manufacturer has no duty to 
warn of risks to hypersensitive or allergic plaintiffs.  Id.  The purposes behind the 
rule are clearly apparent in the Sterling Drug court’s statement of the rule. 
 39 See Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 838 n.11 (Conn. 2001) (listing forty-
four state and federal jurisdictions that have adopted the Rule); Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 
No. 2002-SC-0746-CL, 2004 WL 1361954, at *8 & n.3 (Ky. June 17, 2004) (listing 
thirty-four states that have adopted the Rule); see also 2 FRANK C. WOODSIDE, III, M.D., 
J.D., DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY § 14.02[2][b][i], at 14-39 (“The learned intermediary 
doctrine is nearly universally accepted with respect to warnings for prescription 
drugs . . . .”). 
 40 Sterling Drug, 370 F.2d at 83-84. 
 41 Id. at 85. 
 42 In fact, the Sterling Drug court did not expressly state that the warning given to 
the physician stands in place of a legally adequate warning to the consumer, but 
merely stated that, if a warning is given to the physician, “there is an excellent chance 
that injury to the patient can be avoided.”  Id. 
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does not expressly support the corollary that the duty to warn the 
prescribing physician supersedes, rather than supplements, a duty to 
warn the user of the product.43  That corollary was soon firmly 
established, however.  In the 1973 case of Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co.,44 
the plaintiff alleged injury from the use of novocain as a spinal 
anesthetic, and sought damages from the drug’s manufacturer under 
a failure-to-warn theory.45  The manufacturer had provided a warning 
to the physician but not to the patient.46  The Court dispensed with 
the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim by stating: “We believe that it was 
unreasonable to suppose that a drug manufacturer must go beyond 
the physician and give actual warnings to the patient.  Once the 
physician has been warned, the choice of which drugs to use, and the 
duty to explain the risks involved, is his.”47  The Gravis court gave 
three justifications for not requiring a drug manufacturer to warn the 
patient directly: (1) “The entire system of drug distribution in 
America is set up so as to place the responsibility of distribution and 
use upon professional people”; (2) “professionals are in the best 
position to evaluate the warning put out by the drug industry”; and 
(3) “[g]enerally speaking, only a physician would understand the 
propensities and dangers involved.”48  Today, it is clear that the Rule 
consists of two parts: (1) the manufacturer’s provision of a legally 
adequate warning to the prescribing physician and (2) the 
accompanying exemption from the duty to warn the end user.49  As 
 
 43 Comment k to section 402A of the Second Restatement states in relevant part that 
an unavoidably unsafe product, “properly prepared, and accompanied by proper 
directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.”  SECOND 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 402A cmt. k.  Section 402A, however, does not answer 
the question of to whom “proper directions and warning[s]” must be given.  Id.   
 44 502 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); see also Davis v. Wyeth Labs., 399 F.2d 
121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968).  Although Gravis cites to a 1955 case for the proposition 
that there is no duty to warn the patient directly, the cited case does not stand for the 
proposition that a drug manufacturer has no duty to warn the patient directly, but 
rather that a physician’s failure to disclose the known dangers of a particular 
anesthetic was not negligence because the patient had impliedly consented to the 
administration of an anesthetic during childbirth.  See Hall v. United States, 136 F. 
Supp. 187, 193 (W.D. La. 1955). 
 45 Gravis, 502 S.W.2d at 869-70.  The Gravis case was a particularly apt one for the 
application of the learned intermediary rule, since the drug at issue was a surgical 
anesthetic, and one would ordinarily not expect a patient to concern himself with 
the details of this choice.  In Gravis, the drug in question was not itself the treatment, 
but merely a means to effecting the surgical treatment sought by the plaintiff. 
 46 See id. at 870. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See generally Goodson v. Searle Labs., 471 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D. Conn. 1978); 
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Whitley 
v. Cubberly, 210 S.E.2d 289, 292 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974); McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. 
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Parts II and III of this Article will show, however, the justifications 
offered for the learned intermediary rule have changed very little 
since 1973, despite vast changes in the health care delivery system.50 
B. Recognized Exceptions 
Even the learned intermediary rule in its current form 
acknowledges that in some situations prescription drugs are 
dispensed in circumstances which do not permit delegation of the 
duty to warn to the prescribing physician.  The few recognized 
exceptions to the learned intermediary rule each attempt to identify 
a category of prescription drug use in which there is no effective 
intermediary to intercede between the manufacturer and the 
consumer of prescription drugs.  While these exceptions have been 
somewhat successful in identifying common situations in which drugs 
are dispensed outside the doctor–patient relationship, in practice 
they are both underinclusive and overinclusive, and thus fail to 
adequately police the pharmaceutical marketplace.  For example, 
because of the rapid pace of change in the health care market, there 
are now more drug sales than ever occurring outside the context of 
the doctor–patient relationship, and many of these sales are not 
captured by the current exceptions.51  Furthermore, the mechanistic 
application of the exceptions by most courts may in some cases 
remove the protections of the learned intermediary rule even though 
a drug was in fact dispensed in the context of a doctor–patient 
relationship.  Thus, in their current form, the generally recognized 
exceptions fail to carry out the purposes of the Rule. 
1. Mass Vaccines 
The most widely recognized exception to the learned 
intermediary rule is the mass immunization exception under which 
vaccinations delivered in a clinic without significant participation by a 
physician do not qualify for the protection of the learned 
intermediary rule.52  Warnings of the risks attendant on such vaccines 
 
Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974). 
 50 See infra Parts II & III.B. 
 51 See infra notes 185–86 and accompanying text (describing online sales of 
prescription drugs without a prescription). 
 52 The learned intermediary rule, and the tort system generally, have been 
significantly altered in the childhood vaccine area by the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, tit. III, 100 Stat. 3743, 3755 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2000)).  This Act was passed by Congress 
in 1986 in response to a growing number of lawsuits alleging injury from childhood 
vaccinations.  It essentially establishes a national compensation fund, the National 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, for injuries from such vaccinations, without 
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must therefore be delivered and tailored to the vaccine’s recipient.53  
This exception is explicitly grounded in the lack of physician 
participation in the medical decision-making process.  Since the 
patient does not have an opportunity to receive the benefit of a 
physician’s individualized judgment as to the desirability of the 
vaccine, the manufacturer of the vaccine cannot expect a physician to 
deliver a suitable warning to the patient or to exercise independent 
medical judgment in helping the patient make a decision whether or 
not to use the product.54  Significantly, the same vaccine, 
administered under a physician’s direction during an office visit, is 
subject to the learned intermediary rule, and assuming a legally 
adequate warning to the physician, an injured patient cannot look to 
the vaccine manufacturer for compensation.55 
The mass vaccine exception was the first exception to the 
 
regard to negligence or fault.  It also limits tort lawsuits against vaccine 
manufacturers for injuries which are compensable from the Program.  See, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2) (barring some civil lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers 
until after a petition for compensation is filed with the Program), § 300aa-21 
(providing that, after a judgment is entered on a petition filed with the Program, the 
petitioner may elect to receive the compensation (if any) awarded under the 
Program or else file a civil suit for damages).  The Act, however, does not bar all such 
lawsuits.  See Schafer v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding 
that parents’ claims for loss of consortium are not barred).  Therefore, the Act does 
not render the tort system, or the learned intermediary rule, entirely obsolete in this 
area. 
 53 See generally Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1436 (8th Cir. 1984); Reyes v. 
Wyeth Labs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264, 1275 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 
F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968); Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948, 957-58 (Nev. 
1994); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Okla. 1974). 
 54 In cases of unavoidably unsafe products, unlike other products which carry 
warnings, the purpose of the warning is not to enable the consumer to use the 
product more safely (although certain warnings may in fact serve that purpose in the 
prescription drug context, such as a warning that the drug will make the user drowsy 
and should not be used while operating heavy machinery).  Rather, such warnings 
are used solely to allow the user to make an informed decision whether or not to use 
the product at all, since many of the risks of these products are not avoidable, no 
matter how safely the product is used.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 
949 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[T]here are two very different types of warnings 
that might be associated with a particular product: (1) an unavoidable risk warning; 
and (2) a preventable risk warning.”).  Thus, courts have required plaintiffs to show, 
in cases of unavoidable risks, that the requested warning would have changed their 
behavior instead of establishing the issue via the presumption that a preventable risk 
warning would have been heeded.  Id. at 814 (declining to adopt the presumption 
under Mississippi law).  But see Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1281 (adopting the presumption of 
causation in an unavoidable risk case under Texas law). 
 55 See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Labs. Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 1173, 1178 
(5th Cir. 1989).  To the extent that this represents an effort by the courts to tailor the 
application of the learned intermediary rule to specific circumstances of the drug’s 
use, this is entirely consistent with the thesis of this Article. 
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learned intermediary rule to be articulated.  In Reyes v. Wyeth 
Laboratories,56 a plaintiff allegedly injured by the polio vaccine57 sued 
the vaccine’s manufacturer.  The vaccine had been administered by a 
registered nurse as part of a clinic-based childhood immunization 
program.58  Although Wyeth, the manufacturer, had provided 
package insert warnings with the vaccine to the nurses administering 
the injections, neither the nurses nor the consent form signed by 
plaintiff’s parent conveyed any of the warning information to the 
patient.59 
The jury found for the plaintiff.60  On appeal, Wyeth argued that 
the trial court had erred in not applying the learned intermediary 
rule to the case.61  In fact, the appellate court could have resolved this 
case in Wyeth’s favor under the learned intermediary rule.  Wyeth 
had provided full disclosure of the risks of the vaccine to the health 
care providers involved,62 and the health care providers had at least 
two opportunities to convey those warnings to the patient’s parent, 
but chose not to do so.63  The court could have concluded that 
responsibility for the failure to warn rested with the health care 
professional and not the drug manufacturer.  The court, however, 
chose instead to articulate an exception to the Rule for mass 
vaccinations. 
The mass vaccine exception is the clearest and most widely 
accepted exception to the learned intermediary rule.  In cases like 
Reyes, there is no intermediary, or at least no effective intermediary, 
between the patient and the manufacturer.  Although there is a 
health care professional administering the vaccine, that professional 
is usually not a licensed physician.64  Furthermore, the vaccine is 
 
 56 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 57 Although defendant Wyeth Laboratories (“Wyeth”) contested the issue at trial 
by claiming that the plaintiff’s polio was in fact a “wild” strain not present in its 
vaccine, the jury rejected this theory by holding Wyeth responsible for the plaintiff’s 
injuries.  Id. at 1271. 
 58 Id. at 1270. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1269. 
 61 Id. at 1277 (rejecting Wyeth’s argument that prior cases should be 
distinguished). 
 62 For a discussion of the status of nurses and other non-physician health care 
workers under the learned intermediary rule, see infra note 64 and accompanying 
text. 
 63 The patient’s mother had signed a consent form allowing the administration 
of the vaccine, which made no mention of any of the risks of the vaccine.  Reyes, 498 
F.2d at 1270.  Nor did she receive any information about risks directly from the nurse 
administering the injection.  Id. at 1270-71. 
 64 Although the Reyes court held that the registered nurse who administered the 
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administered outside the context of a doctor–patient relationship 
and there is thus no opportunity for individualized consideration of 
whether the vaccine is appropriate for the patient. 
2. Oral Contraceptives 
A second exception, recognized only by a minority of 
jurisdictions, is the oral contraceptive exception.  This exception is 
grounded in part on an extension of the reasoning in the mass 
vaccine cases.  In those cases, the exception was justified on the 
grounds that a physician does not act as an intermediary between the 
patient and the vaccine manufacturer.65  In the contraceptive cases, 
plaintiffs similarly argue that although physicians must be consulted 
in order to obtain the drug in question, they do not in fact play their 
traditional role of advisor and decision maker, but are much more 
likely to simply defer to the wishes of the patient and prescribe the 
drug.66 
The contraception exception was articulated by the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1985 in the case of MacDonald v. 
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.67  The plaintiff in MacDonald was prescribed 
 
polio vaccine was not a learned intermediary, some courts have held that, in certain 
circumstances, a non-physician health care worker can perform the function of a 
learned intermediary.  See Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 470, 478 
(N.D. W. Va. 1989) (holding that nurse who administered DPT vaccine in public 
clinic was learned intermediary since she discussed medication with patient and 
made considered medical judgment before administering vaccine); Walker v. Merck 
& Co., 648 F. Supp. 931, 934 (M.D. Ga. 1986), aff’d without opinion, 831 F.2d 1069 
(11th Cir. 1987); Singleton v. Airco, Inc., 314 S.E.2d 680, 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) 
(holding that nurse anesthetist qualified as learned intermediary because she was 
familiar with side effects of medication); Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co. v. Medrano, 28 
S.W.3d 87, 93 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding, inter alia, that nurses as well as doctors can 
be learned intermediaries for purposes of the doctrine).  If a non-physician health 
care worker has the appropriate training to evaluate the warning and make a medical 
judgment as to the effectiveness and desirability of the treatment for the particular 
patient before her, she should be considered an effective intermediary, because the 
policies behind the Rule will be advanced by applying the Rule in that setting.  That 
determination, however, should not be made lightly.  The Rule should only be 
applied after a full consideration of the status and relevant training of the health 
care worker and after proper exercise of individualized medical judgment by that 
health care worker on behalf of the patient. 
 65 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
 66 See, e.g., Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 380 (E.D. Mich. 
1985).  But see Allen v. Searle, 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48 (D. Or. 1989) (holding that 
learned intermediary rule would apply to an intrauterine contraceptive device 
(“IUD”) because of participation of prescribing physician in selection and insertion 
of device, despite the “greater degree of patient participation” in the decision to use 
the device). 
 67 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985). 
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oral contraceptives by her physician and later suffered a stroke.68  She 
alleged that the stroke was caused by blood clotting, a known side 
effect of the contraceptive.69  Although the manufacturer’s warning 
material, which described the potential for abnormal blood clotting 
and brain damage, was provided to the patient, it did not mention 
the word “stroke.”70  A jury agreed that this omission rendered the 
product unreasonably dangerous and returned a verdict for the 
plaintiff and against the manufacturer.71  The trial judge, however, 
granted defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict based on the learned intermediary rule’s exemption of drug 
manufacturers from the duty to warn the patient directly.72 
On appeal, the manufacturer argued that Massachusetts should 
accept the reasoning of other jurisdictions that had applied the 
learned intermediary rule to prescription contraceptives.73  The 
Supreme Judicial Court, however, identified several characteristics of 
contraceptives that, it concluded, justified the creation of an 
exception to the learned intermediary rule.  These included: the 
active involvement of the patient in the decision to use the drug; the 
relatively passive role of the physician; the status of “the pill” as “a 
convenience, rather than a traditional medication”;74 the relative lack 
of post-prescription involvement by the physician; and the existence 
of FDA regulations requiring direct warnings to the patient.75  The 
court concluded that the learned intermediary rule should be 
abrogated for oral contraceptive drugs and that the manufacturer’s 
duty to deliver a legally adequate warning runs directly to the patient. 
This exception stretches the mass vaccine rationale.  The most 
significant change is that, in the typical oral contraceptive fact 
pattern, the drug is actually dispensed within the context of a doctor–
patient relationship.76  Despite this, the other factors identified by the 
 
 68 Id. at 67. 
 69 Id. at 67 n.4. 
 70 Id. at 67. 
 71 Id. at 68. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 69 n.10 (quoting Statement of American Medical 
Association in March 14, 1970 issue of Science News, quoted in Comment, Liability of 
Birth Control Pill Manufacturers, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1526, 1532 (1972))). 
 75 Id. at 69.  For further discussion of the relationship between the FDA mandate 
and the learned intermediary rule, and the current debate over preemption in this 
context, see infra Part III.D. 
 76 See Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 380 (E.D. Mich. 1985); 
Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F.Supp. 867, 874-75 (E.D. Mich. 1985); 
Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Wis. 1981); MacDonald, 
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MacDonald court, such as increased patient involvement in the 
treatment decision-making process and the relatively passive role of 
the physician, justify abrogation of the learned intermediary rule in 
the contraceptive context.77  Since the rationale behind the learned 
intermediary rule requires not only that the prescribing physician be 
present, but that she also be in a position to act as an effective 
intermediary between the patient and the drug manufacturer, 
jurisdictions which have adopted this exception recognize that the 
mere presence of a prescribing physician does not offer adequate 
protection to the patient in the circumstances described above.78 
3. FDA-Mandated Patient Warnings 
Where the FDA requires specific information to be furnished to 
the patient,79 in addition to the warnings furnished to the physician, 
the learned intermediary rule may not apply.80  The leading case on 
 
475 N.E.2d at 70. 
 77 Fewer courts have extended this exception to encompass contraceptive devices 
such as IUDs.  See, e.g., Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (D. Or. 
1989) (declining to apply contraceptive exception in case involving a Cu-9 
contraceptive device because “although a greater degree of patient participation may 
be involved in the choice of a prescription contraceptive than in some other 
prescription drugs, the physician makes the ultimate decision as to whether a 
particular contraceptive requested by the patient is appropriate”).  In cases where 
courts have been willing to make this extension, the rationale for the exception is the 
same—the fact that the patient makes the decision to use the product, the fact that 
the product is not being used in a medical context but rather for the patient’s 
convenience, and the fact that there is essentially no significant follow-up care by the 
physician, are held to justify abrogation of the learned intermediary rule. 
 78 See supra note 77.  It may be true that in cases of surgically implantable devices, 
the physician assumes the role of an intermediary; however, to the extent that the 
Allen court and other courts refuse to recognize an exception because of the mere 
presence of a physician in the chain of distribution, this is inadequate reasoning.  See 
Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co. v. Medrano, 28 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Tex. App. 2000) (refusing to 
recognize exception for prescription contraceptives “even when a physician makes 
no individualized judgment in prescribing and administering a prescription drug”). 
 79 In the 1980s, there was a brief move toward requiring patient warnings for all 
prescription drugs.  Although that initiative was rescinded in 1982, patient package 
inserts are still required for certain drugs.  Drugs for which a patient package insert is 
required include estrogens, 21 C.F.R. § 310.515 (2004), oral contraceptives, 21 C.F.R. 
§ 310.501 (2004), and nicotine, Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298, 299-300 
(Okla. 1997).  Such inserts are required “only when there is a need to communicate 
detailed risk information about a drug product or instructions for using the 
product.”  Labeling Requirements for Systemic Antibacterial Drug Products 
Intended for Human Use, 68 Fed. Reg. 6062, 6072 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 
21 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
 80 See, e.g., Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1286 n.10 
(N.D. Okla. 2000); Hatfield v. Sandoz-Wander, Inc., 464 N.E.2d 1105 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1984); McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045 (Wash. 1989).  Contra In re 
Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that, 
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this exception is Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals.81 
In Edwards, the widow of a long-time smoker brought an action 
against the manufacturer of a nicotine patch that had been 
prescribed to her husband.82  The plaintiff’s husband had died from a 
heart attack resulting from a nicotine overdose incurred from using 
the product while still smoking.83  Although the manufacturer 
specifically warned the prescribing physician of the risk of death by 
overdose if the patient smoked cigarettes while using the patch, the 
warning provided by the manufacturer to the patient only stated, “an 
overdose might cause you to faint.”84  The manufacturer argued that 
it had satisfied both its tort duty to warn the prescribing physician 
under the learned intermediary rule and its separate duty, imposed 
by the FDA,85 to directly warn the patient.  After the district court 
granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment,86 the issue 
framed for the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
was the effect of FDA approval of a patient warning87 on that 
warning’s adequacy under principles of tort law.88 
The Edwards court noted that there are two lines of cases on the 
issue of the relationship between FDA regulation and tort regulation 
of the adequacy of a patient warning.  Under one line of cases, the 
FDA mandate eliminates the learned intermediary rule from the 
analysis, and state tort principles are used to determine the adequacy 
of the warning.89  Under the second line of cases, the FDA mandate 
merely carves out an exception to the learned intermediary rule as 
delineated by the specific mandate.90  Only under the first line of 
 
under Texas law, existence of FDA-mandated patient warning would not preclude 
application of learned intermediary rule). 
 81 Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 116 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 82 Id. at 1342. 
 83 The deceased was actually wearing two nicotine patches, and smoking a 
cigarette, at the time of his fatal heart attack.  Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 The content of the warning given by Basel Pharmaceuticals to the patient, 
although alleged to be defective by plaintiff due to its failure to disclose the risk of 
death from an overdose of nicotine, had been approved by the FDA.  Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Although no evidence was actually adduced that the FDA had in fact approved 
the content of Basel’s patient warning, the allegation of FDA approval was 
uncontested and so taken as true by the Tenth Circuit and the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court.  See Edwards, 116 F.3d at 1343 n.1; Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298, 
299-300 (Okla. 1997). 
 88 Edwards, 116 F.3d at 1343. 
 89 See, e.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69-70 (Mass. 1985); 
McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 532-35 (Or. 1974). 
 90 See, e.g., Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1032 (D.N.J. 1988); 
Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398, 399 (Del. 1989). 
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cases—the stronger version of the exception—would a court engage 
in independent analysis of the adequacy of the FDA-mandated 
warning.  Under the second, weaker version, only failure to deliver 
the specific FDA-mandated text would result in tort liability.91 
Since the tort standard is a matter of state law, and since the 
issue was one of first impression in Oklahoma, the Tenth Circuit 
certified the question of which version of the exception to use to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court for an advisory opinion regarding 
Oklahoma law.92  The Oklahoma court held that the strong exception 
should apply, and that compliance with a specific FDA mandate does 
not preclude examination of the adequacy of the warning under state 
tort law principles.93  This is the position taken by the reporters of the 
Third Restatement as well, who state in the comments to section 6: 
“[The Third Restatement] recognize[s] common-law causes of action 
for defective drug design and for failure to provide reasonable 
instructions or warnings, even though the manufacturer complied 
with governmental standards.”94 
The justification for the FDA-mandate exception is on its face 
somewhat different than either the mass vaccine or oral contraceptive 
exception.  On closer examination, however, they are related.  Under 
the strong version of the FDA exception, unlike the mass vaccine 
exception, the context in which the drug is prescribed does not enter 
into the analysis.  The principal justification for the exception seems 
 
 91 In 1993, I argued that compliance with an FDA mandate should not preempt 
analysis of the adequacy of a warning under state tort law—a position consistent with 
the first line of cases.  See generally Timothy S. Hall, Bypassing the Learned Intermediary: 
Potential Liability for Failure to Warn in Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 2 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 449, 466-73 (1993) [hereinafter Hall, Bypassing].  I 
continue to believe that independent review of the adequacy of warnings is the better 
analysis.  This is consistent with the approach taken by the Third Restatement, which 
concludes that “a product’s compliance with an applicable product safety statute or 
administrative regulation is properly considered in determining whether the product 
is defective . . . but such compliance does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of 
product defect.”  THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 4(b).  For more on the 
preemption debate, see infra Part III.D. 
 92 Edwards, 116 F.3d at 1343. 
 93 Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298, 303 (Okla. 1997).  Although the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court spoke in terms of whether compliance with the FDA 
mandate “reinstates” the Rule, id. at 301-03, this is not quite accurate.  The issue is 
not whether the learned intermediary rule is “reinstated,” but whether the Rule 
exempts the manufacturer from state tort analysis of the quality and content of the 
warning provided to the patient. 
 94 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 6 cmt. b.  Furthermore, section 4 of the 
Third Restatement provides: “[A] product’s compliance with an applicable . . . 
regulation is properly considered in determining whether the product is 
defective . . . but such compliance does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of 
product defect.”  Id. § 4(b). 
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to be that, since the FDA has made an independent decision that 
direct warnings to the patient are (for whatever reason) necessary, 
tort law should act to regulate the content of those warnings.  Thus, 
the existence of the FDA mandate itself is enough to trigger the 
exception to the learned intermediary rule and an independent 
examination of the content of the patient warning. 
In order to appreciate the relationship between the exceptions, 
one must consider the FDA’s decision to mandate direct warnings to 
patients for particular categories of prescription drugs.  To the extent 
that the rationales for the FDA’s decision to mandate direct warnings 
to patients mirror the justifications used in the mass vaccine or oral 
contraceptive cases, the courts in applying this exception are simply 
deferring to the FDA’s judgment that, in these cases, there is 
sufficient risk that the physician in the doctor–patient relationship is 
not an effective intermediary. 
4. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising 
The final exception to the learned intermediary rule has been 
argued largely in theory,95 with only one court to date adopting it as a 
matter of positive law.96  The direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) advertising 
exception holds that the learned intermediary rule should not apply 
when a plaintiff is led to seek a prescription for the drug by direct-to-
consumer advertising sponsored by the drug manufacturer.  
Proponents of this exception argue that by inserting itself into the 
medical decision-making process, formerly the sole province of the 
doctor and patient, the drug manufacturer is detracting from the 
authority of the physician as intermediary.97  The proponents further 
 
 95 See generally Mitchell S. Berger, A Tale of Six Implants: The Perez v. Wyeth 
Laboratories Norplant Case and the Applicability of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to 
Direct-to-Consumer Drug Promotion, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525 (2000); Ozlem A. Bordes, 
The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: Should the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Be Shielded from Liability?, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267 
(2004); April L. Foreman, Web of Manipulation: The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and 
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising on the World Wide Web, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 97 (2001); 
Bradford B. Lear, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the Age of Direct Consumer 
Advertising, 65 MO. L. REV. 1101 (2000); Patrick Cohoon, Comment, An Answer to the 
Question Why the Time Has Come to Abrogate the Learned Intermediary Rule in the Case of 
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 1333 (2001). 
 96 See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999). 
 97 This effect is noted in other areas of the law as well.  See W.E. ‘Ted’ Afield, 
Note, The New Drug Buyer: The Changing Definition of the Consumer for Antitrust 
Enforcement in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 203, 209-10 
(arguing that for purposes of defining the “consumer” of prescription drugs in 
antitrust cases, DTC advertising undermines traditional view that prescribing 
physician is the consumer). 
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contend that, by voluntarily assuming the role of provider of 
information regarding the drug, the manufacturer should also 
assume the legal duty to provide an adequate warning about the 
dangers of the drug.98  In 1995, users of the contraceptive implant 
known as Norplant sued the manufacturer, alleging harm arising 
from side effects of the medication as well as difficulties in removing 
the implants.99  Although a prescription contraceptive, Norplant had 
been extensively marketed directly to consumers as a more 
convenient alternative to daily-dose oral contraceptives.100  However, 
the advertisements, although in compliance with FDA rules 
governing direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs,101 did 
not mention the potential for pain and scarring associated with the 
removal of the device.102 
Wyeth Laboratories, the manufacturer of Norplant, argued that 
the warnings of the risk of such adverse effects given to the plaintiffs’ 
physicians should preclude liability under the learned intermediary 
rule.  In 1999, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that that 
state’s learned intermediary doctrine did not apply to drugs which 
were marketed directly to consumers.103  The court held that drug 
manufacturers that advertised to consumers directly were legally 
required to provide an “adequate warning of the product’s dangerous 
propensities,”104 and that compliance with FDA guidelines on direct-
to-consumer marketing of prescription drugs created a prima facie 
presumption that such a warning had been given.105  While the New 
 
 98 Foreman, supra note 95, at 114 (“[T]he drug manufacturer has advertised itself 
into the role of the Learned Intermediary, and must accept responsibility of warning 
the end consumer.”); Lear, supra note 95, at 1115 (under the learned intermediary 
rule, “drug manufacturers can hide behind the learned intermediary doctrine and 
continue to present information regarding the benefits of their products without 
being required to inform the consumer of the risks”). 
 99 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1248. 
 100 Id. 
 101 A full discussion of the regulation of direct-to-consumer advertisement of 
prescription drugs is outside the scope of this Article.  Commentators have argued 
that existing FDA regulation of direct-to-consumer advertising in fact does not 
adequately protect consumers of prescription drugs.  For more on this subject, see 
Timothy S. Hall, The Promise and Peril of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Promotion 
on the Internet, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Hall, Promise and 
Peril]. 
 102 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1248. 
 103 Id. at 1254-57. 
 104 Id. at 1257. 
 105 Id. at 1257-59.  Although this ruling is at least consistent with the holding in 
Edwards—that compliance with an FDA-mandated warning does not wholly preempt 
application of state tort law to determine the adequacy of a warning—it in fact 
provides the manufacturer a substantial shield from liability.  Because of the lack of 
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Jersey Supreme Court in Perez was the first court to adopt a DTC 
exception to the learned intermediary rule,106 other jurisdictions have 
not followed New Jersey’s lead,107 nor have there been further 
reported cases in New Jersey alleging injury from failure to warn in 
DTC advertisements. 
The Perez case involved a nexus between the DTC and 
contraception exceptions to the learned intermediary rule.108  The 
outcome in Perez could thus be read as merely another contraception 
case.  The Perez court, however, clearly did not intend it that way and 
explicitly declined to analyze the case in the context of other cases 
creating an exception to the learned intermediary rule for 
prescription contraceptives.109  In a subsequent Norplant class action, 
a federal district court analyzed the learned intermediary rules of all 
fifty states and agreed that the DTC exception articulated by the New 
Jersey court was not the same as the contraceptive exception 
articulated by the Massachusetts courts.  In the Norplant class action, 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held 
that, as a matter of choice of law doctrine, the Massachusetts rule 
would not prohibit the application of the learned intermediary rule 
to Norplant cases governed by Massachusetts law.110 
The Perez case identified several theoretical justifications for a 
DTC exception to the learned intermediary rule.  These include: 
 
litigation on point, it is not clear what evidence would suffice to overcome the 
presumption that compliance with FDA regulations satisfies the duty to warn.  This 
issue will be important in determining the viability of future failure-to-warn claims 
based on direct-to-consumer advertising.  In fact, the reason for the lack of 
subsequent litigation alleging direct-to-consumer advertising as an exception to the 
learned intermediary rule may be the perceived strength of the presumption that 
compliance with FDA regulations satisfies the tort duty as well.  See THIRD 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 4(b) (providing that compliance with regulatory 
requirements should not preclude finding that a product is defective). 
 106 Although the Perez court was the first to hold that a DTC exception exists, the 
first suggestion of such an exception by a court appears to have come eight years 
earlier.  In 1991, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
noted in a footnote that “[i]n an appropriate case, the advertising of a prescription 
drug to the consuming public may constitute a third exception to the learned 
intermediary rule.  By advertising directly to the consuming public, the manufacturer 
bypasses the traditional physician–patient relationship, thus lessening the role of the 
‘learned intermediary.’”  Garside v. Osco Drugs, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 208, 211 n.4 (D. 
Mass. 1991).  Despite the Garside court’s recognition in dicta of the theoretical 
grounds for such an exception, that case did not involve DTC advertising, so the 
learned intermediary rule was held to apply.  Id. 
 107 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 806-12 
(E.D. Tex. 2002) (providing summary of state laws regarding this exception). 
 108 See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1247. 
 109 Id. at 1256. 
 110 Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d at 810-11. 
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1. The drug manufacturer, having undertaken to provide 
information about the drug to the consumer, should have the 
corresponding duty to ensure that the information provided is 
complete and accurate.111 
2. Abolition of the learned intermediary rule in cases of DTC 
advertising recognizes the increasing importance of the patient’s role 
in choosing medical treatment rather than having it chosen for him 
by the physician.112 
3. Abolition of the Rule recognizes that DTC advertising, by 
providing information directly to the patient, “encroaches on [the 
doctor–patient] relationship by encouraging consumers to ask for 
advertised products by name.”113  In addition, advertising of 
prescription drugs aimed directly at the consumer may create the 
mistaken impression in the mind of the consumer that the products 
are safe or that the FDA has approved the advertisement.114 
The existing exceptions to the learned intermediary rule fail to 
adequately give effect to the purposes behind the Rule.  By merely 
establishing categories of exceptions to the blanket exemption from 
the duty to warn the end user,115 the Rule fails to adequately address 
the rapid pace of change in the modern health care marketplace.  
When combined with judicial reluctance to embrace new exceptions, 
this creates a market distortion in which drug manufacturers have the 
ability and resources to communicate effectively with end users, but 
are not given legal incentives to do so in a responsible manner. 
C. The Learned Intermediary Rule as a Blanket Exemption 
The learned intermediary rule is properly thought of as an 
 
 111 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1257 (“When a patient is the target of direct marketing, one 
would think, at a minimum, that the law would require that the patient not be 
misinformed about the product.”). 
 112 Id. at 1256-57 (“Patient choice is an increasingly important part of our medical-
legal jurisprudence.”). 
 113 Id. at 1256 (quoting Susan A. Casey, Comment, Laying an Old Doctrine to Rest: 
Challenging the Wisdom of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
931, 956 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114 See supra note 111; see also Michelle Andrews, Money & Medicine: Risky Turn on 
Madison Avenue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003, at 9 (discussing advertisements for medical 
devices, and noting that “Consumers, accustomed to the Food & Drug 
Administration’s rigorous approval process for drugs, may assume that the same 
applies to medical devices.  It doesn’t. . . .  In the absence of clinical trials data, 
people don’t have the information they need to evaluate whether one product is 
better than others”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 115 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. 19591, 2003 WL 21658613, at *5 
(Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 2004) (“Absent a recognized exception, [the] learned 
intermediary doctrine controls this case . . . .”). 
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exception to the general rule of law that product warnings, to be 
legally effective, must be given to the end user of a product.116  This 
exception, in keeping with its rationale, should apply only when an 
effective intermediary exists.117  As currently implemented by the 
courts, however, the learned intermediary rule constitutes a blanket 
exemption from a duty to warn the consumer of a prescription drug 
of the potential dangers of the drug.  The vast majority of courts 
apply a virtually irrebuttable presumption118 that, absent one of a few 
narrowly drawn exceptions, an effective intermediary exists.  Courts 
generally do not engage in an analysis of the facts of each case to 
determine whether the Rule should apply.119 
A few plaintiffs have challenged this conception of the Rule and 
have argued that courts should engage in fact-specific reasoning in 
determining whether the learned intermediary rule should apply, but 
have met with little success.  In Swayze v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc.,120 the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant drug manufacturer should have 
known that there was a pervasive practice in Mississippi by which 
physicians in fact did not exercise independent medical judgment in 
making drug-prescription decisions with respect to a certain narcotic 
anesthetic, and that this drug was in fact administered without 
adequate supervision by licensed medical professionals.121  The court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s concerns, as well as plaintiff’s analogy to non-
pharmaceutical case law,122 holding that the classification of the drug 
 
 116 See Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 764 N.E.2d 814, 820 (Mass. 2002) (observing that 
the Rule “is an exception to the general rule that a manufacturer or retailer of an 
unavoidably dangerous product must directly warn all foreseeable consumers of the 
dangers of its product”); Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1999). 
 117 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 118 In fact, this presumption most often goes undiscussed by courts, most of which 
do not even recognize the possibility of the absence of an effective intermediary.  See, 
e.g., Hall v. Elkins SINN, Inc., No. 03-31030, 2004 WL 1418787, at *3 (5th Cir. June 
22, 2004) (per curiam) (“[T]he ‘learned intermediary doctrine’ applies in this case, 
because it involves a prescription drug.”).  Note that the possibility of a lack of an 
effective intermediary is at least recognized by the Third Restatement.  See infra notes 
139-143 and accompanying text. 
 119 Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2002-SC-0746-CL, 2004 WL 1361954, at *10 (Ky. June 
17, 2004) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) (expressing belief that learned 
intermediary rule “provides a type of summary immunization for pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and makes the adequacy of warnings to the ultimate consumer a 
question of law for the court and not a question of fact for the jury”). 
 120 807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 121 Id. at 470.  The drug in question was a surgical anesthetic, which plaintiff 
alleged was administered by medical technicians without adequate training, thus 
giving rise to plaintiff’s injury.  See id. at 465, 471. 
 122 Plaintiff made reference to Gordon v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 
1182 (5th Cir. 1978), in which the court held that a warning given to plaintiff’s 
employer was inadequate, and that the warning should have been given to individual 
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as a prescription drug controlled, and that as a result, plaintiff had 
not raised any material issue of fact sufficient to overcome a motion 
for summary judgment.123 
The plaintiff also attempted to overcome the presumption that a 
warning to the prescribing physician was adequate in Bacardi v. 
Holtzman.124  In Bacardi, the plaintiff argued that summary judgment 
as a matter of law was inappropriate because factual issues still 
remained regarding the manner in which he gained access to the 
drug (namely, outside of a physician–patient relationship).  The 
Bacardi court stated, “It is the general rule that in the case of 
prescription drugs warnings of potential adverse effects to the 
prescribing physician is [sic] sufficient.”125  The court rejected 
plaintiff’s appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant, holding that only in cases falling within a recognized 
exception to the learned intermediary rule would concerns about the 
lack of a physician–patient relationship be heard.126 
Another excellent example of the approach taken by courts to 
the learned intermediary rule is Vitanza v. Upjohn Co.127  In Vitanza, 
plaintiff’s decedent was a 34-year-old male with a history of allergies 
to aspirin and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, who died after 
taking a tablet of Ansaid.128  Although the drug had not been 
prescribed for him, but for his wife,129 Mr. Vitanza, knowing of his 
allergy, attempted to ascertain whether the drug was safe for him to 
take.  After examining the drug’s packaging, as well as reference 
materials, and finding no express statement warning him against 
taking the drug,130 he took one tablet and died several hours later of a 
severe allergic reaction.131 
Vitanza’s widow sued Upjohn, the manufacturer of the drug, 
 
operators of the machinery in question.  Swayze, 807 F.2d at 471 (citing Gordon, 574 
F.2d at 1192).  This supports the thesis that courts apply different analyses in 
prescription drug cases than in other cases involving intermediaries, and that the 
analysis in the prescription drug cases is far more conclusory than that applied in 
other industries. 
 123 Swayze, 807 F.2d at 469. 
 124 442 A.2d 617 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981). 
 125 Id. at 619; see also Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 644 (4th Cir. 
1981) (“[T]he duty an ethical drug manufacturer owes to the consumer is to warn 
only physicians . . . .”). 
 126 Bacardi, 442 A.2d at 620. 
 127 271 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 128 Id. at 91.  Ansaid is prescribed to treat arthritis.  Id. at 90. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Perhaps Mr. Vitanza should have realized that the name of the drug, Ansaid, 
“is an acronym for A Non Steroidal Anti Inflammatory Drug.”  Id. 
 131 Id. at 91. 
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alleging that the failure to label the drug as a non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory drug (“NSAID”) constituted a failure to warn, 
rendering the drug unreasonably dangerous.132  Upjohn, moving for 
summary judgment, asserted the learned intermediary rule as a 
defense, claiming that its warning to prescribing physicians of the 
nature of the drug discharged its duty, and that it owed no duty to 
warn Vitanza.133  Vitanza argued that the learned intermediary rule 
should no longer be applied automatically, but instead should trigger 
an inquiry into whether in fact an effective intermediary existed.134  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit initially 
expressed some doubt about whether Connecticut law would 
recognize the learned intermediary rule as a defense as a matter of 
law.135  The court noted that Connecticut’s recently adopted Products 
Liability Act might give support to Vitanza’s argument, and that 
recent changes in the health care marketplace might justify a more 
fact-based approach to the Rule.  The Second Circuit therefore 
certified to the Connecticut Supreme Court the question of whether 
the learned intermediary rule should bar Vitanza’s claim as a matter 
of law.136 
The Connecticut Supreme Court soundly affirmed the 
traditional approach to the learned intermediary rule,137 holding that 
no fact-based inquiry was needed to grant Upjohn’s motion for 
summary judgment and that Vitanza’s claim was barred as a matter of 
law.  In reaching this conclusion, the court merely repeated the 
boilerplate defenses of the Rule, including the legal requirement of a 
prescription to obtain the drugs.  The court expressly approved of 
the use of categorical exceptions to take account of changes in the 
prescription drug marketplace. 
The treatment of the learned intermediary rule as a bright-line 
exception was perhaps justifiable in 1966, when the rule was first 
articulated.  At that time, the health care market was simpler, and a 
paternalistic doctor–patient relationship was more firmly established 
as the dominant paradigm of health care delivery.  Today’s health 
care system, however, no longer permits the unexamined 
 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 214 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 135 Id. at 78-79. 
 136 Id. at 74. 
 137 Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 847 (Conn. 2001) (“[W]e see no reason 
to create an entirely new exception on the facts of the present case, where the 
traditional doctor–patient relationship existed, there were no communication 
problems, and adequate warnings were provided to the prescribing physician.”). 
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presumption that prescription drugs are dispensed in the context of 
an ideal doctor–patient relationship.138  In contrast to courts’ 
overwhelmingly reflexive and uncritical application of the Rule to 
virtually all prescription drug cases, this Article proposes a more 
nuanced application of the Rule that (1) recognizes that the Rule is 
an exception to the primary doctrine that warnings run to the 
ultimate consumer of a product; (2) takes into account developments 
in the health care marketplace; and (3) establishes an approach 
capable of adapting to future changes in the development, marketing 
and use of prescription drugs. 
D. The Third Restatement—A Step in the Right Direction 
In 1998, the American Law Institute approved a new and 
controversial139 revision of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability.140  Although section 6(d) of the Third Restatement appears to 
recognize the diminishing utility of the traditional learned 
intermediary rule, ultimately, the Comments and Reporter’s Notes to 
that section reveal that the Third Restatement continues to rely on 
identification of categorical exceptions to the Rule rather than 
revision of the Rule itself. 
The approach of the Third Restatement to failure-to-warn claims 
involving prescription drugs is contained in section 6, which provides 
in pertinent part: 
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe 
due to inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable 
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are 
not provided to: 
(1) prescribing and other health care providers who are in a 
position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the 
instructions or warnings; or 
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason 
to know that health care providers will not be in a position 
to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the 
instructions or warnings.141 
The Third Restatement thus explicitly recognizes that in certain 
 
 138 See infra Part II (describing changes in the health care marketplace since 
1966). 
 139 See generally Michael J. Wagner & Laura L. Peterson, The New Restatement (Third) 
of Torts—Shelter from the Product Liability Storm for Pharmaceutical Companies and Medical 
Device Manufacturers?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225 (1998). 
 140 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 6. 
 141 Id. § 6(d). 
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circumstances, health care providers may not be in a position to act 
as effective intermediaries.  The approach of the Third Restatement, 
however, is flawed in two respects.  The first flaw is apparent from the 
Comments and Reporter’s Note to section 6. Comment e, “Direct 
Warnings to Patients,” makes reference to the existing mass vaccine, 
FDA mandate, and DTC advertising exceptions.  The Reporter’s Note 
to comment e restates the vaccine exception and notes that “[t]he 
Institute has left to developing case law whether other exceptions . . . 
should be recognized.”142  Thus, although the language of subsection 
(d)(2) itself could be read to support a case-by-case determination of 
whether a learned intermediary exists, as proposed in this Article, this 
is not borne out in the Comments or Reporter’s Notes, which 
continue to espouse an analysis based on identification and 
mechanical application of categorical exceptions. 
Furthermore, despite the recognition in the Third Restatement 
that in certain circumstances health care providers may not be in a 
position to act as effective intermediaries, to date, few courts have 
accepted this invitation to refine the learned intermediary rule to 
reflect modern health care trends.143  The time has come both to 
recognize the changed health care marketplace and to move beyond 
the categorical exception model which has characterized the learned 
intermediary rule to date.  In this proposed evolution of the Rule, it is 
hoped that the Third Restatement’s treatment of the traditional Rule 
will provide impetus for courts to further reconsider the learned 
intermediary doctrine along the lines advanced in this Article. 
E. The Sophisticated User Doctrine 
1. Description of the Doctrine 
Drug companies are not the only product manufacturers that 
sell products into a chain of distribution, rather than directly to end 
users.  Although standard tort doctrine provides that a 
 
 142 Id. § 6 cmt. e, reporter’s note. 
 143 See, e.g., Pumphrey v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 334, 337-39 (N.D. W. Va. 
1995) (holding that where manufacturer provided legally adequate warning of 
dangers of medical device directly to physician, manufacturer had no further duty to 
warn patient directly); Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35, 46 (Ill. 
2002) (declining to apply standard from Third Restatement because it was not raised at 
trial or appropriately briefed).  Pumphrey cited to a provision in a tentative draft of 
the Third Restatement.  906 F. Supp. at 338.  See also Transue v. Aesthetech Corp., 341 
F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2003) (evaluating medical device claim under standards of Second 
Restatement rather than Third Restatement); Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2002-SC-0746-CL, 
2004 WL 1361954 (Ky. June 17, 2004) (adopting Third Restatement version of learned 
intermediary rule, but as a blanket exemption). 
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manufacturer’s duty to warn extends through the chain of 
distribution to the end user,144 the sophisticated user doctrine 
operates to relieve that duty in certain cases by reason of the 
characteristics of a particular market. 
The sophisticated user doctrine looks superficially like the 
learned intermediary rule.  As summarized in comment n to section 
388 of the Second Restatement, under proper circumstances, an 
adequate warning given to a third party, not the end user, will be 
sufficient to discharge the manufacturer’s duty to warn despite the 
fact that the warning was not in fact passed on to the end user by the 
intermediary.145  This rule is typically invoked in situations where 
there is little communication, if any, between the manufacturer and 
the end user of the goods, such as when component parts are 
supplied for incorporation into a finished product,146 or when 
products are sold to an employer for use by its employees.147  In these 
circumstances, the Second Restatement concludes, it is reasonable for 
the manufacturer to rely on the intermediary to convey the warning 
to the end user and the manufacturer should suffer no legal liability 
for the intermediary’s failure to do so.148  The similarity of the 
circumstances involved in a sophisticated-user situation to the 
 
 144 See, e.g., SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 388 cmt. l (“The supplier’s duty 
is to exercise reasonable care to inform those for whose use the article is supplied of 
dangers which are peculiarly within his knowledge.”) (emphasis added). 
 145 Id. § 388 cmt. n. 
 146 See, e.g., Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(odorizing agent added to propane used in residential hot water heater); Parker v. 
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 909 P.2d 1, 7 (N.M. 1995) (component substances 
of dental implants); see also Lee v. Butcher Boy, 215 Cal. Rptr. 195 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(addressing issue of injury caused by defective motor used to power meat grinder); 
infra note 150 (discussing the related “bulk seller doctrine”).  Despite occasional 
confusion by some courts, Union Carbide Corp. v. Kavanaugh, No. 4D03-2956, 2004 WL 
1393537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 23, 2004) (applying the sophisticated user defense 
of § 388 but using the terminology of the learned intermediary rule), or litigants, 
Bremer v. Egan Healthcare Corp., No. Civ.A. 03-1418, 2004 WL 1396314, at *4 (E.D. La. 
June 21, 2004) (“As the walker in this litigation was dispensed to the plaintiff by 
doctor prescription, the defendant argues that the learned intermediary or 
sophisticated user doctrine applies.”), these are two distinct doctrines of law. 
 147 See, e.g., Swope v. Columbian Chems. Co., 281 F.3d 185, 205-11 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that manufacturer must establish that employer knew or reasonably should 
have known of product’s dangers to trigger sophisticated user doctrine).  The 
sophisticated user doctrine is most often used in lawsuits by employees injured by 
products sold to the employer in bulk, but has also been used in cases brought by the 
retail purchaser of those products. See Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and 
Sophisticated Users: Encouraging the Use of Intermediaries to Transmit Product Safety 
Information, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185, 1220-21 (1996) (describing cases brought by 
retail purchasers of products which were decided using the sophisticated user 
doctrine). 
 148 SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 388 cmt. n. 
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tripartite relationship between a drug manufacturer, physician, and 
patient is obvious.  As the next section will demonstrate, however, the 
details of the sophisticated user doctrine vary in material respects 
from the learned intermediary rule. 
2. Sophisticated Users and Learned Intermediaries 
Both the sophisticated user doctrine and the learned 
intermediary rule allow the manufacturer of a dangerous product to 
delegate to others the duty to warn the product’s end users of its 
dangers.149  Despite the superficial similarities, however, courts have 
approached the two doctrines in very different ways.150 
A good example of the application of the sophisticated user 
doctrine is found in Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc.151  In Smith, the 
plaintiffs were employees of Valley Mould, which purchased sand 
from defendant Walter C. Best, Inc.152  In the course of their 
employment, plaintiffs came into contact with the sand and 
 
 149 There are actually two “sophisticated user” issues in products liability law.  The 
first merely provides that there is no duty to warn of a risk of which the user of a 
product is already aware.  Therefore, courts have held that a “sophisticated user” who 
is aware of the risks of a product cannot complain of the seller’s failure to deliver a 
warning.  See Matherne v. Poutrait-Morin/Zefal-Christophe, Todson, Inc., 868 So. 2d 
114, 120-21 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (finding actual knowledge on part of plaintiff).  The 
second doctrine applies where, as discussed in this Article, a manufacturer sells a 
product to a third party who makes the product available to end users.  The issue in 
these cases is to what extent the manufacturer can rely on the intermediary—the so-
called “sophisticated user”—to deliver adequate warnings about the safe use of the 
product.  See. e.g., Mohr v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 674 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2003).  It is this second doctrine which is the subject of this discussion.  For 
a discussion of potential jury confusion between the two doctrines, see Mozeke v. 
International Paper Co., 933 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 150 There is a third doctrine relevant to this discussion called the “bulk seller 
doctrine.”  Much like the learned intermediary and sophisticated user doctrines, the 
bulk seller doctrine provides that when a manufacturer provides dangerous products 
in bulk to a third party for repackaging and sale to end users, the manufacturer may 
only warn the intermediary and is not required to ensure that a warning makes its 
way to every end user.  See, e.g., Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, No. 01-0652, 
2004 WL 2090592, at *1 (Tex. Sept. 17, 2004).  However, courts have generally held 
that, as with the sophisticated user doctrine and unlike the application of the learned 
intermediary rule, the bulk seller doctrine only shields a manufacturer from liability 
if the reliance on the intermediary was reasonable in the circumstances.  See, e.g., 
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 850-51 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The bulk seller, 
therefore, fulfills its duty to the ultimate consumer only if it ascertains (1) that the 
distributor to which it sells is adequately trained, (2) that the distributor is familiar 
with the properties of the product and the safe methods of handling it, and (3) that 
the distributor is capable of passing this knowledge to the consumer.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 151 927 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 152 Id. at 737-38. 
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eventually developed silicosis, a respiratory disease.153  Plaintiffs sued, 
alleging that their injuries were caused by defendants’ failure to 
provide them with warnings of the dangerous nature of their 
product.154  The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants pursuant to the sophisticated user doctrine, and plaintiffs 
appealed.155 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
reviewed the district court’s findings of fact and noted: 
The district court focused on whether Valley Mould was a 
knowledgeable purchaser of silica sand and upon whether the 
sand suppliers failed to exercise reasonable care in relying upon 
Valley Mould to provide appropriate employee warnings.  The 
[district] court [found] ample record evidence to support the 
conclusion that Valley Mould was a knowledgeable industrial 
purchaser of silica sand, familiar with the dangers associated with 
inhaling silica dust and with proper dust control methods.  The 
court also concluded that Valley Mould was in a superior position 
to supply effective employee warnings.156 
The contrast between the district court’s analysis of whether the 
sophisticated user doctrine should insulate the manufacturer from 
liability and the typical learned intermediary analysis could not be 
more stark.  The sophisticated user analysis is a fact-based, 
circumstance-sensitive inquiry157 into the reasonableness of the 
manufacturer’s behavior and the relationships among the 
manufacturer, the intermediary, and the injured party.158  In contrast, 
the typical learned intermediary case focuses solely on whether or not 
the facts fit one or more predefined exceptions.159  The result is that 
learned intermediary cases (i.e., prescription drug cases) tend to be 
 
 153 Id. at 738. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 740. 
 157 See also Case v. Merck & Co., No. Civ. A. 02-1779, 2002 WL 31478219, at *5 
(E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2002) (declining to grant summary judgment without specific 
evidence as to whether an effective intermediary existed because “there [was] no 
factual record before the Court upon which to base a finding that the vaccine 
manufacturers were sophisticated users”). 
 158 This is the analysis contemplated by the Second Restatement.  Comment n to 
section 388 of the Second Restatement provides a set of factors for courts to apply in 
deciding whether a manufacturer’s behavior was reasonable in the circumstances.  
These include: (1) the degree of harm posed by the product; (2) the “known or 
knowable character of” the intermediary relied on by the manufacturer; (3) the 
burden which would be imposed on the manufacturer by requiring direct warnings; 
and (4) the practicality of having the goods themselves carry the warning to the end 
user.  SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 388 cmt. n. 
 159 See supra part I.C. 
  
2004 LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE 225 
disposed of by summary judgment while sophisticated user cases tend 
to reach a jury for determination of the reasonableness of the 
warning given.160 
The Reporters of the Third Restatement recognized the difference 
between the application of the sophisticated user doctrine and the 
learned intermediary rule.  Unlike the learned intermediary rule, 
they wrote that under the sophisticated user doctrine, “There is no 
general rule as to whether one supplying a product for the use of 
others through an intermediary has a duty to warn the ultimate 
product user directly or may rely on the intermediary to relay 
warnings.  The standard is one of reasonableness in the 
circumstances.”161  This is obviously very different from the learned 
intermediary rule, which has developed as a bright-line rule of 
exemption from the duty to warn the end user. 
Recall the case of Vitanza v. Upjohn Co.162  In Vitanza, the Second 
Circuit asked the Connecticut Supreme Court to decide the issue of 
whether the learned intermediary rule was a bar to liability or a 
defense to be considered by the fact finder.163  Although the Second 
Circuit noted that Connecticut courts had in previous cases been 
willing to treat the learned intermediary rule as a case-by-case 
defense, in part due to “changed conditions in the health care 
industry, including direct marketing . . . and increased patient 
choice,”164 the Connecticut Supreme Court chose to reaffirm the 
bright-line nature of the learned intermediary rule, concluding that 
“[t]he learned intermediary doctrine stands for the proposition that, 
as a matter of law, the prescribing physician . . . is the person best able 
 
 160 Compare Conwed Corp. v. Union Carbide Chems. and Plastics Co., Inc., 287 F. 
Supp. 2d 993 (D. Minn. 2001) (denying summary judgment to manufacturer of 
asbestos), and Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 155 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1997) (precluding summary judgment in favor of defendant due to fact issue as to 
reasonableness of odorant supplier’s reliance on intermediary), with Wright ex rel. 
Trust Co. of Kan. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming 
grant of summary judgment in learned intermediary rule case). 
 161 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 2 cmt. i; see also SECOND RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 18, § 388 cmt. n (“[I]t is obviously impossible to state in advance any set of 
rules which will automatically determine in all cases whether one supplying a chattel 
for the use of others through a third person has satisfied his duty . . . by informing 
the third person of the dangerous nature of the chattel . . . .”); Hoffman v. 
Houghton Chem. Corp., 751 N.E.2d 848, 856 (Mass. 2001) (“[I]n certain limited 
circumstances, ‘a manufacturer may be absolved from blame [for failure to warn] 
because of a justified reliance upon . . . a middleman,’ so long as such reliance is 
reasonable.”) (quoting Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 697 (Mass. 1946)) 
(emphasis added) (alterations in internal quotation in original). 
 162 271 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001); see supra notes 127–37 and accompanying text. 
 163 See Vitanza v. Upjohn, 778 A.2d 829 (Conn. 2001). 
 164 Vitanza, 271 F.3d at 92. 
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to take or recommend precautions against the harm.”165  This 
formula, which is accepted without question by a significant majority 
of courts, encapsulates the difficulty with applying the Rule in the 
context of the modern health care market. 
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE 
A. The Rule Fails to Reflect Modern Medical Practice 
1. Diminution of the Authority of the Physician 
When the learned intermediary rule was first articulated, the 
doctor–patient relationship was very different than the relationship 
which exists today.  In 1966, physicians were substantially 
autonomous in their role as medical advisors and decision makers for 
their patients.166  A patient’s health insurer, if he had one, did not 
exercise any meaningful oversight over a physician’s spending or 
practice patterns, and physicians were almost certainly paid on a fee-
for-service basis.  In contrast, today, 78 million Americans under the 
age of 65 receive health insurance and health care through some 
form of managed care organization.167  Managed care is defined by 
the convergence of health insurance and the delivery of health 
services,168 and is characterized by significant oversight of and 
limitation on the independent authority of the physician.169  The 
growth of managed care is explained in large part as a market 
reaction in the 1970s and 1980s to the dramatic increases in the cost 
 
 165 Vitanza, 778 A.2d at 841 (emphasis added).  Unfortunately, the Connecticut 
court in Vitanza failed to take account of two things.  First, the radical changes in the 
health care marketplace since the articulation of the learned intermediary rule, and 
second, the fact that the rule is in fact not, as the court stated “a rule of law stating a 
duty,” id. at 840, but is rather an exception to the general rule that warnings are 
owed to the end user of an unavoidably unsafe product.  See supra note 116 and 
accompanying text. 
 166 For an excellent discussion of the lack of meaningful communication in the 
traditional, fee-for-service doctor–patient relationship, see JAY KATZ, THE SILENT 
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984). 
 167 NAT’L CENTER FOR HEALTH STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2003, WITH CHARTBOOK ON TRENDS IN THE HEALTH OF 
AMERICANS 339 tbl.132, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/tables/2003/03hus132.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 
2004).  For a more complete description of the managed care revolution and its 
effect on the doctor–patient relationship, see Timothy S. Hall, Bargaining with 
Hippocrates: Managed Care and the Doctor–Patient Relationship, 54 S.C. L. REV. 689 
(2003) [hereinafter Hall, Bargaining with Hippocrates]. 
 168 Hall, Bargaining with Hippocrates, supra note 167, at 692-94. 
 169 Id. at 694-99. 
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of health care under a fee-for-service system, and one of the principal 
goals of managed care has been to deliver medical services as 
efficiently as possible.170  Unfortunately, one of the casualties of this 
drive for efficiency has been the quality of the physician–patient 
interaction, as physicians are pressured by financial incentives to 
perform more services in less time.171  These circumstances allow 
physicians little time to process warnings provided by drug 
manufacturers into forms in which they will be heard, understood, 
and heeded by patients.  Although the physician still performs a 
gatekeeping function, since even in the modern doctor–patient 
relationship physicians can refuse to prescribe drugs that they believe 
to be unhelpful or contraindicated,172 this gatekeeping function is less 
concerned with patient education and empowerment than it is an 
exercise of a physician’s clinical judgment.  Simply put, the structure 
of the modern doctor–patient relationship does not allow the 
physician to occupy the ideal ethical role which underlies the learned 
intermediary doctrine—that of collaborative decision making and 
tailoring the technical warnings delivered by the drug company into a 
form suitable for the patient. 
Managed care is also characterized by increased control over the 
doctor–patient relationship by third party payors.  In the 
pharmaceutical context, managed care companies exert control over 
drug choices in three ways: by use of pre-authorization requirements, 
through use of formularies, and by using prescription benefit 
managers (“PBMs”).  Formularies are lists of covered drugs for which 
the MCO will pay or which will be subject to lower co-payment and 
deductible costs than non-formulary drugs.  These formulary drugs 
are often chosen, not solely on the basis of therapeutic benefit, but 
also on the basis of cost discounts negotiated between the managed 
care company and the manufacturer of the drug.173  Prescription 
 
 170 Id. at 690.  There is substantial debate, however, whether cost savings seen in 
the early years of managed care penetration are sustainable, as medical cost increases 
are once again far outpacing the level of inflation in the economy as a whole.  Id. at 
693. 
 171 For a more complete discussion of financial incentives in managed care, see 
generally Timothy S. Hall, Third-Party Payor Conflicts of Interest in Managed Care: A 
Proposal for Regulation Based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 29 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 95 (1998). 
 172 Today’s health care market, however, provides patients with opportunities to 
obtain drugs even without their physicians’ consent.  See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing 
the rise of Internet pharmacies which will provide prescription drugs outside the 
context of a doctor–patient relationship). 
 173 GEN. ACCT. OFF., PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFITS: IMPACT OF MEDICARE HMOS’ 
USE OF FORMULARIES ON BENEFICIARIES 5-6 (1999). 
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benefit managers are firms employed to reduce the cost of 
prescription drug coverage to MCOs, often through programs to 
encourage the use of generic alternatives and cheaper drugs within 
the same therapeutic class. 
2. Increased Importance of Drug Therapies 
The twentieth century saw the greatest expansion of the 
knowledge and power of medicine in history.  Much of this expansion 
came in the form of pharmaceutical therapies, resulting in more 
effective treatments for scores of diseases.  These advances in drug 
therapies also fueled a dramatic increase in pharmaceutical 
spending,174 and the resulting rise in prescription drug costs still 
reverberates through American health policy debates.175  It is no 
exaggeration to say that drug therapies are now at the core of 
American medical practice, and that few Americans leave a doctor’s 
appointment without a prescription. 
This increased emphasis on pharmacology in modern medicine, 
however, also has its downside.  With the increased efficacy of 
modern medicines has come an increased demand for medication, 
even in situations where the medication is contraindicated or 
unhelpful.176  This can be harmful both to the individual patient as 
well as to the public health.  The literature is replete with 
descriptions of overuse and misuse of antibiotic drugs, to the extent 
that many microbial diseases once successfully treated with antibiotics 
have developed resistance to the commonly used drugs, and are once 
again spreading relatively unchecked.177  Patient demand for drugs 
can lead both to doctor-shopping and, more recently, to patients 
obtaining medication themselves entirely outside the doctor–patient 
relationship. 
 
 174 Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Health Care’s “Thirty Years’ War”: The 
Origins and Dissolution of Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 392 (2004) 
(noting that spending on prescription drugs increased 300% from 1991 to 2001). 
 175 See H. Jeffrey Lawrence, M.D., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs: The Price of 
Success?, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 165, 165-67 (2004). 
 176 See Murray et al., supra note 13, at 521 (reporting that physicians found forty-
nine percent of specific drug requests from patients to be clinically inappropriate). 
 177 See, e.g., Oliver T. Rutschmann & Marisa Elena Domino, Antibiotics for Upper 
Respiratory Tract Infections in Ambulatory Practice in the United States, 1997-1999: Does 
Physician Specialty Matter?, 17 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 196 (2004); U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE, at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/anti_resist.html (last visited Oct. 16, 
2004). 
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3. Increased Emphasis on “Lifestyle” Drugs 
At the same time as advances in pharmaceutical science were 
expanding the physician’s abilities to cure, drug companies were also 
expanding into new markets and redefining the concepts of sickness 
and of medical intervention.  In 1998, Pfizer obtained FDA approval 
for a new drug for the treatment of erectile dysfunction.  The new 
drug, Viagra, was a runaway bestseller for Pfizer178 and arguably 
ushered in a new era of “lifestyle” drugs.179  While the application of 
medical science to cosmetic enhancement is not new, the 
development and use of so-called “lifestyle drugs” has boomed in the 
past few years,180 and the onslaught of such products and therapies 
shows no signs of abating.181 
The increased availability of “lifestyle” drugs has caused 
problems for the health care system, raising questions about the 
appropriateness of coverage for purportedly medically unnecessary 
treatments.182  Particularly in light of the extremely high cost of many 
prescription drugs and many needy individuals’ inability to pay for 
medically necessary drugs, the ethics of spending millions of dollars 
on the development, marketing, and sale of non-medically-necessary 
therapies is debatable. 
One might argue that the purchase of a “lifestyle” drug such as 
Viagra shares several of the characteristics of previously recognized 
exemptions to the learned intermediary rule, and that the Rule 
should therefore simply not apply to such drugs.  This analysis, 
however, is overly simplistic and would be unworkable in practice.  
 
 178 See Viagra: $1 Billion in Sales Expected in First Year on the Market, CHI. TRIB., July 
10, 1998, at C7; A Record Pace for Viagra Sales, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1998, at D6. 
 179 Although certainly some “lifestyle” products such as Rogaine pre-dated the 
Viagra boom, it was Viagra that captured the imagination of the nation.  A search of 
the Nexis “major newspapers” database reveals 1,498 articles with “Viagra” in the title 
during 1998, the year of its introduction. 
 180 See Visage in a Bottle—Bespoke Services Look to the Future, BRAND STRATEGY, May 12, 
2003, at P6, available at 2003 WL 6282132. 
 181 See Jeffrey P. Kahn, Raising the Issue of Viagra Costs—Who Should Pay?, at 
http://www.cnn.com/Health/bioethics/9807/viagra.cost/ (last visited Oct. 16, 
2004) (“The future will likely offer many new drugs like Viagra: expensive drugs that 
have lifestyle benefits without actually curing an illness or disease. . . . The case of 
Viagra represents only the beginning of what will be more difficult decisions about 
who pays for the promising treatments of the future.”). 
 182 See, e.g., State’s Authority over Drug Coverage Upheld, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2003, at 
B6 (describing disagreement between insurers and state officials over which drugs 
are medically necessary and which are “nonessential”).  For an overview of some of 
the legal issues arising from the popularity of Viagra, see generally Kim H. Finley, 
Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Viagra? Demand for “Lifestyle” Drugs Raises 
Legal and Public Policy Issues, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 837 (2000). 
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Although it is true in many cases that such drugs are sought by the 
patient—perhaps after exposure to direct-to-consumer advertising—
and that the physician may play a diminished role in the decision to 
use the drug,183 this is not true of all prescriptions for any given 
“lifestyle” drug.  For example, while Viagra is certainly sought, 
prescribed, and used for lifestyle, cosmetic, or “convenience” 
purposes, it is also used for the treatment of organic erectile 
dysfunction.184  In that latter context, it is far more likely that the drug 
is being prescribed and used within the context of a doctor–patient 
relationship, in which case the learned intermediary rule should 
apply.  This inability to clearly distinguish at first glance between 
“lifestyle” applications and “medical” applications of drugs leads to 
the conclusion that a categorical exception from the protections of 
the learned intermediary rule for “lifestyle” drugs is inappropriate, 
and that a more nuanced approach is required. 
4. Increased Availability of Alternate Outlets for 
Prescription Drugs 
One of the consequences of the Internet economy boom of the 
1990s has been the rise of Internet-based pharmacy services.  While 
many of these online pharmacies are merely cyber-analogues of brick 
and mortar pharmacies or cost-saving mail-order pharmacies run by 
insurance companies, there are Internet pharmacies where 
prescription drugs can be purchased outside of a doctor–patient 
relationship.  Some of these pharmacies employ licensed physicians 
to write prescriptions, usually on the basis of an online questionnaire 
filled out by the customer, while others provide prescription drugs 
without any prescription.185  While such pharmacies are illegal under 
current American drug and physician licensing laws, to date there 
have been no significant efforts by the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) or other regulatory bodies to crack down on such 
operations.  In fact, the international nature of the Internet may 
make regulation of these “on-line” pharmacies virtually impossible, as 
 
 183 These characteristics are typically used by courts that recognize the oral 
contraceptive exception.  See supra Part I.B.2. 
 184 Another example of this difficulty in categorization occurs with cosmetic 
surgery.  For example, breast augmentation is considered a “lifestyle” treatment 
rather than a medical treatment when used in a purely elective context despite the 
fact that it can be used in other cases in a medically necessary fashion such as 
reconstructive surgery after a mastectomy.  There are virtually no so-called “lifestyle” 
drugs or treatments which are not also used for sound medical reasons. 
 185 For a typology of Internet pharmacies, see Barbara J. Williams, Note, On-Line 
Prescriptions and Drug Sales: An Overview of Emerging Issues, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 147 (2001). 
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sellers can readily set up shop beyond the jurisdiction of American 
authorities.  This is compounded by the fact that mailed packages of 
prescription drugs are difficult to interdict at the border.186 
If the manufacturer of a prescription drug knows or should 
know that the product will not be dispensed in the context of a 
meaningful doctor–patient relationship, then there is already support 
in the case law187 and in the Third Restatement188 for not applying the 
learned intermediary rule.  As early as 1974, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, applying Texas law, stated that a drug manufacturer would 
be held to the knowledge of an expert in the “distribution and 
administration of pharmaceutical products.”189  The court further 
stated that, in the context of the administration of the polio vaccine, 
it was generally known that “a great majority of [people] receive 
their . . . vaccine in mass administrations or county clinics manned at 
least in part by [non-physicians].”190  Consequently, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the defendant would be presumed to have known 
that vaccines sold to a state health department would likely be 
administered in such a context.191  The Third Restatement also 
incorporates this principle in its statement that warnings should be 
provided to the patient when a drug manufacturer knows or should 
know that a drug is being sold in a situation where “health-care 
providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in 
accordance with the instructions or warnings.”192 
5. Increased Marketing to the Patient as Decision Maker 
In the past two decades, there has been a dramatic change in the 
promotion of prescription drugs.  In 1966, when the learned 
intermediary rule was first articulated, prescription drugs were 
marketed exclusively at physicians and other health care 
professionals.193  Since that time, marketing materials intended for 
consumers have become the fastest growing segment of the 
 
 186 Letter from Representatives John D. Dingell and Peter Deutsch, to Dr. Mark 
McLennan, FDA Commissioner (July 14, 2003) (describing inadequate interdiction 
practices and procedures in the Louisville, Kentucky UPS facility), available at 
http://www.house.gov/commerce_democrats/press/108ltr43.htm. 
 187 See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 188 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 6(d)(2). 
 189 Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1277. 
 190 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 191 Id. (citing Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968)). 
 192 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 6(d)(2). 
 193 For a more complete discussion of the phenomenon of direct-to-consumer 
prescription drug promotion, see generally Hall, Bypassing, supra note 91; Hall, 
Promise and Peril, supra note 101. 
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pharmaceutical industry’s promotional budget.194  Direct-to-consumer 
marketing is conducted through print and broadcast media and, 
most recently, through the new medium of the Internet. 
Although direct-to-consumer marketing is a fairly new 
phenomenon, studies have shown it to be effective in establishing 
brand name recognition and in creating demand for the advertised 
product.195  Direct-to-consumer advertising has been controversial, 
largely because of perceptions on the part of consumer advocates and 
others that advertisements do not present a fair balance of 
promotional and instructional information about the product 
advertised.196  Opponents of direct-to-consumer advertising point to 
numerous instances of misleading or inaccurate statements about 
advertised products.197 
Despite criticism of direct-to-consumer advertising, such 
promotional efforts are becoming accepted in the health care 
marketplace.  The FDA has not acted to significantly limit the ability 
of drug manufacturers to engage in such advertising;198 and drug 
manufacturers apparently find them a useful adjunct to the more 
traditional promotional efforts directed at health care 
professionals.199  Some commentators recognize that direct-to-
consumer advertisements have potential benefits, including increased 
awareness on the part of patients of new or innovative treatments.200  
 
 194 Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Jumps 185% (Nov. 6, 2003), at 
http://www.pharmacist.com/articles/h_ts_0409.cfm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004). 
 195 MARTA WOSINSKA, COMMENTS ON CONSUMER-DIRECTED PROMOTION, Docket No. 
2003N-0344 (Dec. 1, 2003) (summarizing results of empirical research into the 
effects of DTC advertising), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/dec03/120303/03N-0344-emc-
000017-01.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).  
 196 Foreman, supra note 95, at 110-14 (describing and critiquing the content of 
several promotional Web sites). 
 197 See, e.g., Jackie Judd, Truth in Advertising? FDA Says Many Prescription Drug Ads 
are Deceptive, Jan. 3, 2001 (on file with author). 
 198 See Hall, Promise and Peril, supra note 101, at 3-8 (discussing history of FDA’s 
regulation of direct-to-consumer advertising). 
 199 See Michael Pastore, Internet Pharmaceutical Ads Prove Effective, at 
http://www.cyberatlas.internet.com/markets/advertising/article/0,1323,5941_2941
91,00.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2004) (reporting on study finding that Internet 
advertising to consumers is more effective than traditional print or broadcast 
advertisements); Ross Tieman, Keep Taking the Tablets—Brand Extensions, FIN. TIMES, 
Apr. 16, 2003, at 2 (quoting Jo Pisani of consultants PricewaterhouseCoopers as 
saying, “Increased consumer awareness will lead to more of a ‘pull’ for 
pharmaceutical products by patients, requesting drugs by name, rather than 
traditional ‘push’ model driven by the pharma sales force.”), available at 2003 WL 
17852987. 
 200 STATEMENT OF NANCY M. OSTROVE, PH.D., DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIV. OF DRUG 
MKTG., ADVER. & COMMUNICATIONS, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BEFORE THE 
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Direct-to-consumer advertisements have the potential to help patients 
become more educated partners in making their own health care 
decisions and more likely to follow through with their therapy.  
Direct-to-consumer advertising thus may improve both the ethical 
ideal of patient autonomy and the quality of health care outcomes.  
In any event, the growth of direct-to-consumer advertising clearly 
signals the recognition by drug manufacturers of the importance of 
the consumer’s desires and brand awareness in the health care 
decision-making process.201  Similarly, the law must recognize the 
expanded role of the consumer in the modern health care market. 
Despite some judicial recognition of the increasingly important 
role of the health care consumer, courts have generally not applied 
the same insights to the application of the learned intermediary rule.  
Only New Jersey has recognized an exception to the Rule for direct-
to-consumer promotional activities.  Even in New Jersey, however, 
recognition of this exception has not resulted in subsequent litigation 
seeking to hold drug manufacturers liable for failure to warn.202 
Some commentators have agreed with the New Jersey Supreme 
Court that a categorical exception to the learned intermediary rule 
for drugs advertised directly to consumers is appropriate.203  Even 
though the New Jersey Supreme Court is to be commended for its 
recognition of the potential dangers of direct-to-consumer 
advertising, its approach to the problem is less than optimal.  New 
Jersey requires that companies marketing prescription drugs to 
consumers also provide legally adequate warnings to consumers,204 
 
SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, FOREIGN COMMERCE, AND TOURISM, SENATE COMM. 
ON SCI. & TRANSP. (July 24, 2001) (summarizing potential benefits of DTC 
advertising), at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2001/drugpromo0724.html (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2004); Hall, Promise and Peril supra note 101, at 25-31 (discussing the 
potential benefits and detriments of direct to consumer advertising on the internet. 
 201 See Tieman, supra note 199, at 2 (observing that “increasingly-informed 
consumers are also contributing to a shift in the way the pharmaceutical industry 
regards its brands.  Today, blockbuster drugs such as Prozac, for depression, or 
Viagra, for impotence, have become household names. . . .  Patients . . . can research 
treatments from home on the internet . . . and confront their doctor with the fruits 
of their research”). 
 202 See supra Part I.B.4. 
 203 George W. Evans & Arnold I. Friede, The Food and Drug Administration’s 
Regulation of Prescription Drug Manufacturer Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 365, 423 (2003) (“[B]ecause consumers are shielded by learned 
intermediaries in the selection and use of prescription drugs, it is not essential for 
DTC advertisements to outline what each and every particular risk of a drug might 
be. . . .  Concerning the drug at issue, doctors can be presumed to act responsibly 
and with full information from the operative labeling before issuing consumers a 
prescription.”). 
 204 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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effectively abrogating the learned intermediary rule for heavily 
advertised drugs.  The New Jersey Supreme Court did not establish 
any procedure for determining whether or not the direct marketing 
of the drug in fact undermined the existence of a learned 
intermediary, relying instead on the establishment of a categorical 
exception. 
B. The Rule Reflects an Outdated Ethical View of the Doctor–Patient 
Relationship 
It is no exaggeration to say that the principle of informed 
consent is the bedrock of modern medical ethics.205  In the past forty 
years, increased attention to the informed consent doctrine has 
sparked a revolution in society’s concept of the doctor–patient 
relationship. 
The Hippocratic Oath206 stands as the paradigm of the 
“traditional” paternalistic doctor–patient relationship.  According to 
the Hippocratic concept of this relationship, doctors should not 
inform their patients of the nature of their illnesses or of the 
therapies prescribed for them, as patients were thought to be 
incapable of understanding the complexities of medical practice.207  
This approach, founded on the authority of the physician and the 
compliance of the patient, has been almost completely replaced by 
the principle, as articulated in Canterbury v. Spence,208 that “[e]very 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body . . . .”209  Although widespread 
acceptance of this principle by both the law and the medical 
profession was slow in arriving, patient autonomy is now virtually 
universally recognized as an ethical goal—some say the primary 
ethical goal—of modern American medical practice.210 
Both the principle of autonomy and the related informed 
consent doctrine envision the patient as an empowered partner in 
 
 205 TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 77-80 
(5th ed. 2001). 
 206 See Nova Online, The Hippocratic Oath—Classical Version, at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath_classical.html (last visited Oct. 16, 
2004). 
 207 See generally SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 223-
24 (1978) (noting absence of obligation of veracity in classical physicians’ oaths); 
NHSS Tan, Deconstructing Paternalism, 43 SINGAPORE MED. J. 148, 148 (2002) 
(discerning paternalism in original Hippocratic Oath). 
 208 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 209 Id. at 780 (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 185 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 
1914)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). 
 210 See BEACHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 205, at 77-80. 
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making health care decisions.  As informed consent doctrine 
becomes more robust and respect for patient autonomy is more fully 
recognized in the law, the retention of a learned intermediary rule 
which presupposes the patient’s near total reliance on the physician 
will become increasingly out of touch with the ethical goals of 
medicine.  The law should provide incentives for the health care 
system to more completely realize its aspirational goals and not 
incentives to cut patients out of the decision-making process. 
The law has begun to recognize the increased importance of the 
patient in the health care decision-making process.211  In 1996, in the 
context of a trademark infringement lawsuit filed by the Upjohn 
Company against Wyeth-Ayerst, a rival maker of an estrogen 
replacement therapy, a federal district court concluded that 
“physicians, pharmacists and patients are the consumers relevant to 
determining how likely it is that consumers will confuse” the two 
products.212  The court based its conclusion in large part on the 
extensive efforts by the defendant to target its promotional campaign 
toward potential patients, as well as by using the more traditional 
avenue of advertising to physicians.213  The court noted that the likely 
effect of such direct advertising was to enhance the role of the patient 
in the health care decision-making process and that the 
advertisements were designed to promote “alleged advantages to 
which a lay person is likely to attach some significance: convenient 
packaging, cost savings and the approval of the FDA.”214 
 
 211 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Sanchez, 280 F. Supp. 2d 590, 607 (W.D. Tex. 
2003) (grounding the right to an abortion in, inter alia, principles of bodily 
autonomy); Pekera v. Purpora, 836 A.2d 1253, 1256 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (ruling 
that a physician was justified in declining to provide treatment because of his 
patient’s informed refusal to consent to such treatment); Cohen v. Bolduc, 760 
N.E.2d 714, 721 (Mass. 2002) (finding that a state statute authorizing medical care 
proxies “ensures that a patient’s right of autonomy . . . is respected”); In re Bronx 
Psychiatric Ctr., 728 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (App. Div. 2001) (protecting a patient’s right to 
autonomy in an involuntary commitment case by appointment of counsel); In re 
Duran, 769 A.2d 497, 504-05 (Pa. Super. 2001) (grounding the right to refuse a 
blood transfusion in principles of autonomy). 
 212 Upjohn Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 1:95CV237, 1996 WL 33322175, at 
*3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 1996) (emphasis added). 
 213 Id. at *11 (“While it is true that courts generally do not discuss patients as 
relevant consumers for trademark purposes when the product is a [prescription 
drug] requiring a prescription,  . . . the marketing of PREMPRO differs from caselaw 
precedent. . . .  [D]efendant . . . has targeted directly existing . . . patients and 
prospective . . . patients with . . . promotions.”). 
 214 Id. at *11-12 (“The parties do not dispute that patients as well as physicians and 
pharmacists can come to recognize a prescription drug by its brand name. . . .  
Simply because a patient cannot actually purchase PREMPRO without a prescription, 
does not mean that a patient cannot seek [PREMPRO] from a physician.”).  For facts 
disputing the court’s assumption that a physician is necessarily required to purchase 
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In the context of antitrust law, it is also important to properly 
define the relevant market for a particular type of goods or services.215  
In this area as well, there has been movement towards including the 
consumer in the relevant market definition, recognizing the 
increasing importance of the consumer in the health care decision-
making process.216 
C. The Rule Establishes Improper Incentives for Drug Manufacturers 
The learned intermediary rule has provided at least an indirect 
incentive for drug manufacturers to employ direct-to-consumer 
advertising and other devices to bypass the learned intermediary.  
Because the courts treat the learned intermediary rule as a blanket 
exception to liability for failure to directly warn the consumer,217 and 
do not engage in a case-by-case inquiry as to whether a legally 
sufficient intermediary actually exists, plaintiffs injured by industry 
efforts to bypass the learned intermediary have no valid recourse.  
The learned intermediary rule thus has the effect of creating market 
distortions.218 
 
prescription drugs in today’s health care marketplace, see supra Part III.A.4, which 
describes the rise of Internet pharmacies. 
 215 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 3.2 (2004 ed.) (“[A] key 
threshold element in a [Sherman Act] Section 2 case will ordinarily be the definition 
of the ‘relevant market,’ meaning the particular group of products with which, and 
geographic area within which, the defendant’s product or service effectively 
competes and the effects of its monopolizing conduct are felt.”); Afield, supra note 
97, at 205 (“In any antitrust analysis that involves a properly defined relevant market, 
a plaintiff must establish a relevant geographic market and a relevant product market 
in order to demonstrate that the defendant possesses market power.”). 
 216 See, e.g., Afield, supra note 97, at 207-14. 
 217 See supra Part I.C. 
 218 Unfortunately, such legally generated market distortions are not unknown to 
health law.  The most famous such phenomenon is, of course, the doctrine of ERISA 
preemption under which managed care organizations, especially self-funded 
managed care organizations, are exempt from much state regulation including state 
tort liability.  This has had the effect of insulating MCOs from the tort law 
consequences of their cost containment policies and allegedly wrongful denials of 
care.  Although ERISA preemption in recent years has been considerably softened by 
judicial interpretations, see generally Karen A. Jordan, Recent Modifications to the 
Preemption Doctrine & Their Impact on State HMO Liability Laws, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 
51 (2004), the insulation from tort liability afforded by the ERISA preemption 
doctrine is largely responsible both for the meteoric rise of managed care as the 
dominant health care delivery paradigm in the 1990s and for the recent managed 
care backlash in the popular culture and health policy.  See Karen A. Jordan, Coverage 
Denials in ERISA Plans: Assessing the Federal Legislative Solution, 65 MO. L. REV. 405, 406-
08 (2000).  Health law scholars have argued that the exemption from liability 
granted to managed care organizations by early judicial interpretations of the ERISA 
statute was partly responsible for the development of many questionable managed 
care practices.  These practices include providing primary care physicians with 
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First, the current state of the law gives the drug industry a 
perverse incentive to divert research and development dollars away 
from development of medically necessary drugs to the development 
of so-called “lifestyle drugs.”  The industry has been criticized in 
recent years for focusing on “lifestyle” drugs, because of their higher 
profit margin, to the exclusion of medically necessary drugs, which 
could save lives lost to disease in underdeveloped nations.219  
Furthermore, “lifestyle” drugs constitute many, though by no means 
all, of the drugs that are most heavily marketed directly to consumers 
in the United States,220 and consumer demand for these drugs is 
rising to such an extent that funding for them may supplant other, 
more medically useful drugs in pharmaceutical formularies.221  To the 
extent that drug manufacturers are obtaining a “free ride” from 
liability for lifestyle drugs demanded by consumers, their profits on 
those drugs do not reflect the true cost of the product; and so tort law 
should step in to rectify the situation.  Lower profit margins on 
lifestyle drugs might help to reduce the disparity between the 
attractiveness of these drugs as compared to other, more socially 
useful drugs.222 
Second, the exemption from liability created by the Rule for 
 
overreaching financial incentives to limit the amount of care provided and severely 
limiting physicians’ ability to independently control the care of their patients 
through aggressive use of pre-authorization requirements.  See Hall, Bargaining with 
Hippocrates, supra note 167, at 699-705.  The managed care literature, both scholarly 
and popular, is replete with “horror stories” of injury and death caused by industry 
practices and with allegations that ERISA preemption prevents tort law from 
operating to curtail the depredations of the unfettered marketplace in a market 
characterized by unequal knowledge, unequal bargaining power, and particularly 
vulnerable consumers.  Id. 
 219 James H. Flory & Philip Kitcher, Global Health and the Scientific Research Agenda, 
32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 36 (2004), available at 2004 WL 69026590; Ralph Nader, 
Corporate Supremacy & the Erosion of Democracy, 64 HUMANIST 7 (March 1, 2004), 
available at 2004 WL 63557844; Amy Ellis Nutt, The Next Plague; Killer Bacteria Defeat 
Toughest Antibiotic, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 4, 2004, at D1, available at 2004 WL 
58532055. 
 220 David E. Dukes et al., What You Should Know About Direct-to-Consumer Advertising 
of Prescription Drugs, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 36, 37 (2001) (“DTC detractors note that most 
pharmaceutical products promoted to consumers are ‘lifestyle’ drugs and that drugs 
for more complex conditions and diseases receive less promotion.”). 
 221 Tamar V. Terzian, Note, Direct to Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 25 AM 
J.L. & MED. 149, 160 (1999) (“Potential changes in formularies have raised concerns 
that improving enrollee satisfaction by including requested drugs on formularies may 
divert resources from other important areas.”). 
 222 But see David Brushwood, Responsive Regulation of Internet Pharmacy Practice, 10 
ANN. HEALTH L. 75, 102 (2001) (“Mounting a . . . crusade against bad choices that 
affect nobody other than the person making the choice could have the appearance 
of economic protectionism, no matter how well intended as a public health 
measure.”). 
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information conveyed to consumers in advertisements, combined 
with drug companies’ insulation from the economic effect of 
increased drug spending on the health care economy as a whole, 
creates a disproportionate incentive to advertise and thus increase 
demand without due consideration of the relative value of the drug.  
This increasing push on the part of drug companies to create 
consumer demand for the latest drug, which often translates to the 
most expensive drug, is beginning to create a backlash from 
employers, insurers, and others who are concerned about the 
dramatic rise in overall health care costs.223  Some go so far as to claim 
that direct-to-consumer advertisements directly contribute to rising 
drug costs.224 
A case-by-case approach would give drug companies an 
additional incentive to take care in their promotional efforts and to 
more carefully police the channels through which their drugs are 
distributed.  Since a manufacturer would have a defense to a claim 
for failure to warn if in fact the patient had the benefit of a full 
disclosure and consultation by a physician, drug companies would 
naturally disfavor sales through Internet pharmacies that provide 
prescriptions based on merely a checklist, with no face-to-face 
interaction or physician–patient relationship.225 
 
 223 See, e.g., Thomas M. Burton, Pushing Pills: Reining in Drug Advertising, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 13, 2002, at B1 (quoting General Motors executives as blaming direct-to-
consumer advertising of expensive, unnecessary drugs for a 14% rise in drug 
expenditures, and reporting that GM spent $55 million in 2001 to pay for Prilosec, a 
heavily-advertised heartburn medication, for its workers and retirees). 
 224 Id. (quoting an insurance company executive as saying, “[d]irect-to-consumer 
ads make drugs cost more”). 
 225 This argument has an analogy in current litigation against handgun 
manufacturers.  Cities have attempted to sue handgun manufacturers in tort, 
claiming that they have been injured by crimes committed with handguns negligently 
sold in circumstances which the gun manufacturers knew or reasonably should have 
known would result in those guns being used in illegal activity.  See, e.g., James v. 
Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 34-35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (denying 
defendants’ motion to dismiss lawsuit because the City of Newark had stated a claim 
against multiple defendants for negligence in distribution and sale of handguns).  
Many states and cities plagued by gun violence have passed strict laws barring 
handgun sales within their jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 
F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding local handgun ban against constitutional 
challenge).  Plaintiffs have alleged, however, that handgun manufacturers knowingly 
or recklessly sell to dealers in neighboring jurisdictions with lax gun laws, enabling 
the weapons to be transported and sold illegally in the targeted jurisdictions.  See 
generally Tyrone Hughes, Note & Comment, Hamilton v. Accutek: Potential Collective 
Liability of the Handgun Industry for Negligent Marketing, 13 TOURO L. REV. 287 (1996).  
The case law described in this section is still in the developmental stages and 
substantial uncertainties remain.  These uncertainties include the strong possibility 
of Congressional action to prohibit handgun manufacturer lawsuits and to put an 
end to those lawsuits currently pending.  See Andrew Harris, Court Reinstates Indiana 
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As described above, prescription drugs are increasingly being 
sold through non-traditional channels and increasingly are available 
outside a meaningful doctor–patient relationship or without a 
prescription from a licensed physician.226  These sales, under the 
current approach to the learned intermediary rule, carry a higher 
risk of injury or death resulting from improper use of the drug 
because no actor in the supply chain has a realistic legal incentive to 
warn the end user of the product’s dangers.  Particularly in cases of 
“lifestyle” drugs, consumers may not be mindful of the dangers posed 
by those products in the context of their wide availability, and so 
might not undertake a realistic cost–benefit analysis before deciding 
whether to use them.  The Internet pharmacy and the physician, if 
any, providing the prescription for the drug may be judgment proof, 
located outside the jurisdiction of American courts, or otherwise 
inaccessible.  The current learned intermediary rule, however, forces 
the injured plaintiff to rely on the prescribing physician for legal 
recourse, even when all actors in the chain know or should know that 
the prescription is being filled in the absence of an effective doctor–
patient relationship, and a reasonable informed consent discussion.  
The alternative Rule proposed in this Article would protect the 
consumer by removing the protections of the learned intermediary 
rule from the drug manufacturer when the manufacturer knows or 
should know that there is in fact no effective intermediary, and by 
also providing incentives to drug manufacturers not to sell their 
products through channels in which no legally effective warning is 
likely to be given. 
III. A PROPOSAL 
A. The Contours of the Proposal 
The proposal advanced in this Article starts from a very basic 
premise: The learned intermediary rule should not apply when the 
reasoning behind the rule is not applicable.227  Because of recent 
 
Gun Suit, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 5, 2004, at 5 (describing the Senate version of the Firearms 
Manufacturer Protection Bill as “just five [votes] shy of a filibuster-proof majority that 
would ensure its passage”).  Other potential problems include the difficulty of 
establishing a causal link between an allegedly negligent sale and the injury caused to 
the plaintiff.  Nonetheless, the courts have the opportunity to establish incentives for 
handgun manufacturers to police the sales practices of those with whom they do 
business by integrating the social cost of those products into their price.  This 
argument can easily be applied by analogy to prescription drug manufacturers in the 
modern pharmaceutical marketplace. 
 226 See supra Part II.A. 
 227 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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changes in the pharmaceutical industry,228 courts should no longer 
assume that drug sales should be subject to the learned intermediary 
rule.229  Instead, courts will need to undertake a fact-based analysis of 
this issue.230  The goal of this Article is to give courts a methodology 
for taking into account the diversity of the modern pharmaceutical 
marketplace.231 
The overwhelming majority of courts have applied the Rule as a 
blanket exemption from the duty to warn of standard products 
liability doctrine, without a fact-based inquiry into the necessity or 
desirability of the rule.232  While the learned intermediary rule 
remains a justifiable rule in many instances,233 failure by courts to 
 
 228 See supra Part II.A. 
 229 See, e.g., Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(construing the mass vaccine exception narrowly as “an exception to the general rule 
that, where prescription drugs are concerned, a manufacturer’s duty to warn extends 
only to physicians and not to laymen”).  Although the result in Swayze was probably 
correct, this reasoning is a misapplication of the maxim that exceptions to general 
rules of law are to be construed narrowly.  The Swayze court failed to account for the 
fact that the learned intermediary rule is itself a narrow exception from the general 
rule that the duty to warn runs to the end user of the product.  See also Stanback v. 
Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1981) (describing the mass vaccine 
exception as “quite narrow and highly fact specific”). 
 230 See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and 
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001) 
(discussing how history shapes legal decisions).  Professor Hathaway writes: 
Lock-in or inflexibility can, in turn, lead to inefficiency.  Early decisions 
may lead to formation of a legal rule that becomes increasingly 
inefficient over time. . . .  External circumstances may change, causing 
what was once an efficient rule to become inefficient in light of the 
changed context.  Or what is an efficient rule in one case may be much 
less efficient in a somewhat different context.  Or new information may 
become available that changes the perception of the legal issue and its 
correct resolution.  Or, finally, courts may take what was an efficient 
rule in a narrow set of circumstances and broaden it to encompass a set 
of circumstances in which it is less efficient. 
Id. at 631. 
 231 See, e.g., Afield, supra note 97, at 224 (arguing for a flexible approach in 
antitrust cases, Afield observes that “the variety in prescription drugs today . . . 
indicates that perhaps pharmaceutical consumers need to be defined on a drug-by-
drug basis”).  There is no logical reason why this proposed flexibility cannot also be 
applied to the analysis of prescription drug failure-to-warn claims, allowing the courts 
to ascertain whether the doctor–patient relationship which stands at the heart of the 
learned intermediary rule in fact justifies the Rule’s application. 
 232 See supra Part I.C; see also Mitchell S. Berger, A Tale of Six Implants: The Perez v. 
Wyeth Laboratories Norplant Case and the Applicability of the Learned Intermediary Rule to 
Direct-to-Consumer Drug Promotion, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 546 n.230 (2000). 
 233 This Article does not argue that drug manufacturers should never be able to 
delegate their duty to warn to physicians.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 47–
49 (discussing reasons why the traditional doctor–patient relationship stood as a bar 
to drug manufacturer’s liability for failure to warn). 
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inquire into the justifications for the rule on a case-by-case basis runs 
the risk that the Rule will devolve into a convenient fiction that 
protects drug companies from the consequences of their marketing 
practices.234 
One approach to known inadequacies of a common law rule 
(such as the learned intermediary rule) is to adopt a series of 
exceptions to the rule in order to ameliorate some of the perceived 
injustices that result from its application.235  This approach is useful 
for a time, but eventually, the law must ask whether it would not be 
more appropriate to revise the rule itself to eliminate the need for 
the exceptions, rather than continuing to create bright-line 
exceptions to the rule.236  This time has now come for the learned 
intermediary rule.  The existing exceptions, though grounded on 
valid criticisms of the Rule, do not accomplish the goal of 
 
 234 See, e.g., Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2002-SC-0746-CL, 2004 WL 1361954, at *11 
(Ky. June 17, 2004) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) (“Given that the manufacturers 
are now directly marketing and benefiting by increased sales, they must also assume 
increased share in the risks and duties pertinent to selling a product.”). 
 235 Another example of this type of common law evolution is found in the privity 
of contract requirement.  Originally, claims arising out of injuries caused by defective 
products required an allegation of privity of contract.  See Winterbottom v. Wright, 
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).  Perceiving a need to extend a remedy to plaintiffs 
injured by products purchased by another, the courts created an exception to the 
privity requirement for products which were “of such a character inherently that, 
when applied to the purposes for which [they were] designed, [they were] was liable 
to become a source of great danger to many people . . . .”  Statler v. George A. Ray 
Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063, 1064 (N.Y. 1909).  Eventually, the difficulty associated with 
administering the “inherently dangerous” exception led to the elimination of the 
requirement of privity of contract in negligence actions.  MacPherson v. Buick Motor 
Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1052 (N.Y. 1916) (“[F]or a neglect of such ordinary care or skill 
whereby injury happens, the appropriate remedy is an action for negligence. The 
right to enforce this liability is not to be confined to the immediate buyer.”).  For a 
more in-depth discussion of this doctrinal evolution, see generally Hathaway, supra 
note 230. 
 236 The process of carving out exceptions to a common law doctrine in order to 
rectify its shortcomings has its limits.  See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts 
in an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. 
REV. 527, 556 (2002) (criticizing the process of “carving out more and more 
exceptions to the [common law final judgment] rule,” consequently resulting in the 
“dizzying array of statutory and judicially-created exceptions . . . that make up 
modern finality jurisprudence”); The Honorable Francis J. Connolly, Casenote, 
Landlord/Tenant Law—Code Violations Under Negligence Per Se and Common Law 
Negligence Theories: Gradjelich v. Hance, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2003) 
(noting arguments that exceptions to the common law rule of no landlord liability 
“contribute[] to the ‘erosion of the entire common law rule’”) (citation omitted); 
Matthew F. McLean, Casenote, The Impact of the Wyoming Supreme Court’s Decision to 
Abolish a Portion of the Common Law Status Classifications. Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 
293 (Wyo. 1993), 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 299, 301-11 (1994) (describing evolution 
of common law of possessor’s duty of care to third parties). 
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harmonizing the Rule’s operation with the realities of the health care 
marketplace.237  In fact, the diversity and pace of change in the health 
care market is such that no set of bright-line rules can hope to 
adequately police the therapeutic decision-making process. 
The determination of whether the learned intermediary rule is 
appropriate should not turn, as it does now, solely on the type of 
drug or product being prescribed, but rather on the context of the 
interaction that produces the prescription.  The existing case law 
establishes exceptions to the Rule based on the specific drug or type 
of drug at issue.  For example, several cases hold that oral 
contraceptives, as a class, are exempt from the learned intermediary 
rule.238  This has the benefit of judicial economy and ease of 
application,239 but it does not capture the diversity of contexts in 
which drugs are prescribed and obtained. 
I propose that the learned intermediary rule be transformed 
from a bright-line rule of exemption from liability for failure to warn 
the end user of a prescription drug into a multi-element test to 
determine the presence or absence of a meaningful intermediary in 
the prescription drug context.  Under this revised conception of the 
Rule, the emphasis should be on a manufacturer’s duty to warn an 
end user of an unavoidably unsafe product, and courts should 
analyze each particular set of circumstances in evaluating whether a 
warning to the only intermediary is legally adequate. 
I propose that the learned intermediary rule should be recast as 
follows: 
A manufacturer has the duty to warn the ultimate user of an 
unavoidably unsafe product, notwithstanding the fact that the 
product is sold to an intermediary or that the product is legally 
unobtainable without recourse to an intermediary.  A 
manufacturer may discharge its duty to warn by warning only the 
intermediary when it knows or has reason to know that the 
intermediary is in a position to minimize the risk posed by the 
product. 
In the context of prescription drug failure-to-warn litigation, a 
court should take into account the following list of factors in 
determining whether it is appropriate to warn only the intermediary: 
1. Was the drug prescribed in the context of a face-to-face doctor–
patient interaction? 
 
 237 Cf. Hathaway, supra note 230, at 658-61 (arguing for relaxation of stare decisis 
where “underlying conditions have changed markedly since the legal rule’s 
introduction”). 
 238 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 239 Ausness, supra note 147, at 1235-36. 
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2. Was the drug specifically requested by the patient? 
3. Does the patient have an ongoing opportunity to engage the 
physician in a dialogue about the efficacy of the treatment 
prescribed? 
4. Did the patient seek the drug to treat a medical condition, or 
for its convenience or cosmetic enhancement effects? 
5.  Does relevant regulation require that the patient be directly 
warned of the risks of the drug? 
These factors have the benefit of integrating all of the current 
exceptions to the learned intermediary rule, as well as focusing the 
attention of the courts on other aspects of a drug sale that are 
relevant to the application of the Rule.  The fundamental 
requirement for exemption from the duty to warn the end user is 
that there is in fact an effective intermediary between the 
manufacturer and the user of the product.240 
This revised learned intermediary rule reflects the reasoning of 
courts that have considered other exceptions to the rule.  The theme 
underlying those exceptions is the search for circumstances under 
which the physician does not in fact act as an effective learned 
intermediary for the patient.  These circumstances can be divided 
into two categories: (1) circumstances in which the physician’s 
prescribing power is bypassed through use of modern sales practices 
such as Internet prescribing and dispensing of drugs absent physician 
contact with the patient; i.e., where the physician is not acting as an 
intermediary at all; and (2) circumstances in which, even though 
there is physician–patient contact, the physician does not exercise his 
or her independent judgment or does not in fact provide an 
adequate set of warnings; i.e., where the “learned” nature of the 
physician’s contribution to the decision-making process is bypassed.  
This may include situations in which the choice to take the drug is a 
cosmetic one, not a medical one, and in which the physician is 
perhaps more likely to merely acquiesce in the patient’s demand for 
the drug,241 as well as cases in which a drug company has 
 
 240 As with the sophisticated user doctrine, the learned intermediary rule should 
be applied as a defense to tort liability for failure to warn.  Thus, in order to obtain 
an exception from the general rule of tort law that the duty to warn flows from the 
manufacturer of the product to the end user of that product, the initial burden 
should fall on the drug company to bring forward facts indicating that the drug was 
prescribed and delivered in a context providing for an effective intermediary. 
 241 The phenomenon of physician acquiescence to patient demands is not limited 
to these “lifestyle” drug cases. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (describing 
the over-prescription of antibiotics and the concurrent rise in drug resistant 
pathogens). 
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overpromoted a drug, creating demand in the minds of consumers 
which overrides the contrary advice of their physicians. 
The Rule proposed in this Article is consistent with and builds 
on the insights of the Third Restatement.242  Although the Third 
Restatement preserves the formal separation between the sophisticated 
user doctrine243 and the learned intermediary rule,244 it lays the 
groundwork for collapsing the distinction between them, as 
advocated in this Article.  The Third Restatement provides that the duty 
to warn in prescription drug cases is owed first to the physician, but 
may be owed to “the patient when the manufacturer knows or has 
reason to know that health care providers will not be in a position to 
reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or 
warnings.”245  Unfortunately, as described above,246 neither the 
Restatement247 nor the courts248 have yet taken advantage of the text 
of section 6(d) to amend the learned intermediary rule to take 
account of the substantial changes in the health care marketplace.  
This Article hopes to fill that gap. 
B. Arguments for Retaining the Learned Intermediary Rule 
The learned intermediary rule has demonstrated remarkable 
persistence in the courts, despite an extensive body of scholarship 
identifying the Rule’s shortcomings.249  Those who would retain the 
Rule in its current form generally make three arguments.250  First, 
they argue that the drug industry, unlike an individual’s physician, 
does not have adequate means to identify and communicate with 
potential consumers of a drug.  Second, the current Rule’s advocates 
maintain that patients with no medical or pharmacological training 
will be unable to understand an adequate warning, and will either be 
frightened away from a potentially beneficial drug or will not be able 
to make an informed choice about the risks and benefits of a drug.  
The physician, on the other hand, is in a position to “translate” the 
 
 242 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 243 See, e.g., THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 2(c) & cmt. i. 
 244 See, e.g., id. § 6(d). 
 245 Id. § 6(d)(2). 
 246 See supra Part I.D. 
 247 See THIRD RESTATEMENT supra note 7, § 6(d) & cmt. e. 
 248 See supra note 143. 
 249 See generally sources cited supra note 95; see also Catherine A. Paytash, Note, The 
Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Patient Package Inserts: A Balanced Approach to 
Preventing Drug-Related Injury, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1999). 
 250 For a complete (and more sympathetic) articulation of the arguments for the 
retention of the learned intermediary rule, see Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription 
Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Legal and Regulatory Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141 (1997). 
  
2004 LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE 245 
technicalities for the patient, and to assist in the risk-benefit analysis.  
Finally, advocates of the Rule argue that inserting the drug 
manufacturer into the therapeutic decision-making process by 
requiring warnings to be given directly to patients would 
impermissibly interfere with the doctor–patient relationship. 
This section examines the bases of each of these claims and 
shows that, although each of them can be leveled at the proposal 
made in this Article, they ultimately fail to justify retention of the 
current Rule. 
1. Inability to Communicate with Patient 
The first argument made by advocates of the learned 
intermediary rule is that, because the physician–patient relationship 
provides an ideal context for communicating product warnings, and 
because of the burdens and costs involved in attempting to provide 
adequate warnings to end users of prescription drugs, manufacturers 
should be relieved of a duty to warn the end user.251 
Even under the sophisticated user doctrine, inability to 
communicate effectively with the end user has been held to abrogate 
the duty to warn.252  In House v. Armour of America,253 a police officer 
injured by rifle fire sued the maker of the bulletproof fibers used in 
his protective jacket, arguing that the fiber maker should have had a 
duty to warn him about the limitations of the protection offered by its 
product.254  The court held, as a matter of law, that the lack of a viable 
means of communication between the component part supplier and 
the end user of the bulletproof vest made from its materials vitiated 
the duty to warn the individual user, and that the warning to the 
police department discharged the manufacturer’s duty.255 
If drug manufacturers truly could not effectively communicate 
with the end users of their products, the retention of the learned 
intermediary rule as an incentive to make sure adequate warnings 
 
 251 For a discussion of the use of this justification in the litigation surrounding the 
Dalkon Shield contraceptive device, see James Ottavio Castagnera & Richard Ryan 
Gerner, The Gradual Enfeeblement of the Learned Intermediary Rule and the Argument in 
Favor of Abandoning It Entirely, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 119, 126-28 (2000). 
 252 This is so because “[t]he goal of products liability law is to ‘induce conduct 
that is capable of being performed.’”  Hoffman v. Houghton Chem. Corp., 751 
N.E.2d 848, 857 (Mass. 2001) (quoting Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 
N.E.2d 909, 922 (Mass. 1998)).  If manufacturers truly could not communicate with 
patients, it would make no sense to impose such a duty.  This assertion may have 
been true in 1966; however, it is no longer the case. 
 253 886 P.2d 542 (Utah 1994). 
 254 Id. at 546. 
 255 Id. at 554. 
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flowed through the prescribing physician would be justified.  The 
behavior of drug companies, however, belies the argument that 
effective communication between manufacturers and patients is 
impossible or impracticable.256  Drug companies routinely 
communicate with patients through direct-to-consumer print and 
broadcast advertising, informational Web sites, and other media, and, 
in some cases when required by the FDA, through patient package 
inserts distributed with each prescription.257  Each of these means of 
communication could be adapted to the delivery of legally adequate 
warnings to the patient, when required by the revised rule. 
A more likely scenario is that in some cases, communication 
between the drug company and patients would be relatively simple, 
and in other cases, far more complex.258  Assuming this to be the case, 
it makes sense to have a legal rule that can take account of the 
diversity of circumstances under which prescription drugs are used.  
While the learned intermediary rule as currently implemented 
assumes communication to be impracticable, and abolition of the 
Rule would assume communication to be feasible, the modified Rule 
proposed in this Article allows the reasonableness of communication 
in any given set of circumstances to be weighed by the finder of fact 
in determining the reasonableness of the drug manufacturer’s 
conduct.259 
2. Inability of Patient to Understand Warnings 
Pharmacology is a complex field, and there is no doubt that a 
full understanding of the mechanisms of action and potential for 
 
 256 See Castagnera & Gerner, supra note 251, at 132 (“Through [] zealous 
marketing tactics, manufacturers display the means necessary to adequately inform 
the patient about all product properties necessary to make an informed and 
educated decision.”). 
 257 See, e.g., id. at 123-24 (advocating that burden be placed on manufacturer to 
“provide adequate warnings in the form of patient package inserts . . . to the patient 
with every prescription that is filled”).  The authors point out that this is also 
consistent with modern ethical emphasis on the patient’s right to participate fully in 
decisions concerning his health care.  Id. at 124; see also supra Part II.B. 
 258 For an example of the latter, recall the facts of Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 
S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), discussed supra notes 44-49 and accompanying 
text.  Gravis involved a claim of injury arising from the use of a surgical anesthetic.  It 
seems reasonable to conclude that the drug manufacturer would have fewer 
channels of communication with the patient than in a case involving a prescription 
for antibiotic tablets filled at a pharmacy. 
 259 See, e.g., SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 388 cmt. n (“Here, as in every 
case which involves the determination of the precautions which must be taken to 
satisfy the requirements of reasonable care, the magnitude of the risk involved must 
be compared with the burden which would be imposed by requiring them . . . .”). 
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interactions associated with prescription drugs requires advanced 
study.  It is also true that most patients cannot understand the 
information communicated by drug companies to physicians through 
sources such as the Physicians Desk Reference.260  To claim, however, that 
drug companies are incapable of delivering adequate risk 
information to potential patients fails to recognize at least two 
features of the modern health care market.  First, many complex 
drugs are in fact sold directly to consumers, without recourse to the 
expertise of the physician.261  Second, the success of the 
pharmaceutical industry in communicating with patients and 
potential patients through direct-to-consumer advertising channels 
undercuts the argument that consumers are incapable of 
understanding the risks and benefits of a particular drug. 
3. Interference with the Doctor–Patient Relationship 
A third argument advanced in favor of retaining the learned 
intermediary rule is that direct warnings from the manufacturer 
would impermissibly interfere with the therapeutic relationship 
between doctor and patient.262  While it is certainly true that medical 
decisions are best made in the context of a meaningful, trust-based 
doctor–patient relationship, the law should also recognize that many 
medical decisions are in fact not informed by such a relationship.  In 
these cases, the law should not leave consumers of prescription drugs 
without any remedy against those who had an opportunity, but failed 
 
 260 Foreward to PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE (58th ed. 2004) (“Each . . . entry 
provides . . . an exact copy of the product’s FDA-approved . . . labeling.”) 
 261 The market for over-the-counter (“OTC”) drugs is vast, comprising $11.2 
billion in sales and up to an estimated 300,000 products in 1990.  GEN. ACCT. OFF., 
NON-PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OVER THE COUNTER AND UNDEREMPHASIZED 1 (1992).  
Despite the fact that OTC drugs are readily available to consumers without the need 
for the professional intervention of a physician or pharmacist, one should not 
assume that OTC drugs are free from risk  See id. at 2.  Manufacturers of OTC drugs 
do not enjoy the same freedom from liability for failure to warn as do manufacturers 
of prescription drugs.  Nonetheless, manufacturers seem to have adequately 
discharged their duties to warn consumers of the potential dangers of these 
products.  See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(observing that if defendant concedes its product is not a prescription drug, then its 
sole warning to the health care provider “establishes as a matter of law the 
defectiveness of the [product] for purposes of a prima facie case in strict products 
liability”); Torsiello v. Whitehall Labs., 398 A.2d 132, 139-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1979) (“A consumer of over-the-counter drugs is . . . self-prescribing and is 
intended, expected, and indeed encouraged by the drug industry to do so. He must, 
therefore, also be given such information by the manufacturer as will permit him to 
self-prescribe with a minimum of risk.”), cited with approval by Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 
No. 2002-SC-0746-CL, 2004 WL 1361954, at *4 (Ky. June 17, 2004)). 
 262 Noah, supra note 250, at 170. 
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to provide adequate warnings of the dangerous propensities of their 
products.  In fact, some have argued that, if we as a society take the 
doctor–patient relationship seriously, we should ban drug 
advertisements altogether.  Indeed, it seems somewhat disingenuous 
for pharmaceutical manufacturers to argue that drug advertisements 
do not interfere with the doctor–patient relationship, but that drug 
warnings do.263 
Following the reasoning of the pro-DTC advertisement literature 
provides another argument for rethinking the learned intermediary 
rule in this context.  If consumer-directed advertising enhances the 
information available to the consumer and thus makes the consumer 
a more effective and more informed partner in his own health care 
decisions, surely legal rules which encourage full and fair disclosure 
of both the benefits and risks of drug therapies would only further 
contribute to consumer education and empowerment.264 
The proposal set forth in this Article is not necessarily an 
exclusively pro-plaintiff rule.  For example, recall the case of Edwards 
v. Basel Pharmaceuticals.265  In that case, Edwards died from a nicotine 
overdose after receiving a prescription for a nicotine patch from his 
personal physician.  Absent further evidence of circumstances 
impairing the effectiveness of the physician–patient relationship, the 
reworked Rule proposed herein would not change the outcome of 
the case in favor of Edwards.  The existence of the FDA mandate to 
warn the patient should be considered simply as one factor among 
many related to Edwards’ decision to use the product, and should not 
necessarily result in drug company liability.  It may be that Edwards’ 
recourse, if any, should be against his physician for failure to clearly 
communicate the information contained in the manufacturer’s 
warning to the physician, which plainly disclosed the risk of cardiac 
failure from a nicotine overdose.266 
 
 263 Cohoon, supra note 95, at 1356-57. 
Following the reasoning of the proponents of direct-to-consumer marketing 
provides another argument for rethinking the learned intermediary rule.  If 
consumer-directed advertising enhances the information available to the consumer, 
and thus makes the consumer a more effective and more informed partner in his 
own health care decisions, surely legal rules that encourage full and fair disclosure of 
both the benefits and the risks of drug therapies would only further contribute to 
consumer education and empowerment.  See, e.g., Castagnera & Gerner, supra note 
251, at 132-33 (“Rather than undermine the physician-patient relationship, a 
requirement that manufacturers provide direct-to-consumer warnings in reality 
encourages the patient to question the doctor, thus improving patients’ ability to 
make informed decisions and understand their treatment.”). 
 264 See supra note 263. 
 265 116 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 1997); see supra Part I.B.3. 
 266 Id. at 1342 (finding that the warnings given to physicians were “relatively 
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C. Benefits of the Proposal 
1. Better Serves the Goals of Tort Law 
Treatment of the learned intermediary rule in a case-by-case 
fashion, instead of as a bright-line exemption from the duty to warn 
the end user, will result in a rule which is more likely to accomplish 
the goals of tort law.  Tort law is generally understood to have three 
primary functions: deterrence of socially undesirable conduct, 
compensation of the injured, and, in the case of product liability, 
allocation of the true costs of producing a product to the 
manufacturer of that product.267  The proposed rule accomplishes all 
three functions better than the existing learned intermediary rule. 
First, the proposal would deter certain behavior on the part of 
drug manufacturers.  Under current law, a drug manufacturer is 
extremely unlikely268 to be held responsible in tort for statements 
made in consumer advertisement materials that create a false positive 
expectation about the benefits of a drug, or which downplay the risks 
of a drug.  Despite the existence of some FDA guidance on the 
content of direct-to-consumer advertisement, many believe that 
existing FDA rules do not adequately protect the interests of 
consumers in accurate information about prescription drugs, and 
that many manufacturers in fact do not adequately comply with even 
the minimal regulations in place.  The potential for tort liability 
would help ensure that information conveyed to consumers about a 
prescription drug is accurate and balanced.  Furthermore, this rule 
would give drug manufacturers an incentive to police and prevent the 
sale of prescription drugs into potentially illegal market channels, 
where sales would occur without a physician’s prescription.269 
 
thorough” but that “a package insert addressed to the patient failed to mention the 
possibility of any fatal reaction to nicotine overdose”). 
 267 Absent a tort-like mechanism for requiring manufacturers to bear the cost of 
injuries caused by defective products, manufacturers would have insufficient 
incentive to police the safety of their products, since the cost of injuries caused by 
those products would be borne by the injured individuals or the health insurance 
system.  This would constitute an undesirable subsidy for the product manufacturers, 
and would undesirably lower the cost of dangerous products.  SECOND RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 18, § 402A cmt. c (“[P]ublic policy demands that the burden of accidental 
injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who 
market them, and be treated as a cost of production . . . .”). 
 268 Only one reported case has established an exemption from the learned 
intermediary rule for direct-to-consumer advertising.  See supra Part I.B.4 (discussing 
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Perez decision). 
 269 Of course, this presupposes that drug companies are able to identify 
purchasers who are likely to sell prescription drugs inappropriately.  Indications are 
that manufacturers do in fact have such information at their disposal; for instance, 
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Second, the proposal would ensure that drug manufacturers 
bear a greater share of the costs of injuries caused by prescription 
drugs when those drugs are not dispensed in the context of a strong 
doctor–patient relationship.  Under the existing rule, as long as drug 
manufacturers provide the FDA-mandated “brief summary” 
information to prescribing physicians, the only basis of liability for 
failure to warn is through a challenge to the content of the warning 
given to the physician.  If the drug was in fact purchased outside the 
context of a physician–patient relationship, or if the physician did not 
heed the warning provided, there may be no recourse at all.270  This 
means that a large proportion of the avoidable injuries caused by 
prescription drugs are beyond the concern of drug companies, who 
are able to transfer these losses to the injured consumers themselves, 
or to the physician who prescribed the drug.  Since the drug 
companies have no legal liability in this situation, the true social cost 
of the drug is not reflected in its price, causing the drug to be 
overconsumed.  This is particularly troublesome in cases of “lifestyle” 
drugs, which are prescribed and desired for cosmetic or convenience 
reasons.  There is no reason for society to provide a subsidy to the 
manufacturers and consumers of these drugs in the form of costs 
borne by injured consumers. 
Finally, the proposed rule would increase the availability of tort 
compensation in cases of injury caused by prescription drugs.  In 
cases in which the drug manufacturer contributed to the demand for 
the drug by direct-to-consumer advertising, or contributed to the 
availability of the drug through sales into channels where the 
manufacturer knew or should have known that the product was likely 
to be sold to the end user outside the context of a physician–patient 
relationship, the patient injured by improper use of the drug may 
 
Pfizer recently reacted to the phenomenon of Americans crossing the border into 
Canada to take advantage of that country’s price controls on prescription drugs by 
threatening to restrict supply to Canadian pharmacies supplying the American 
market.  Marketplace, NPR radio broadcast, July 7, 2004.  This tends to show that 
Pfizer is able to (or would be able to if it chose) track the flow of drugs to Canada 
and through the pharmacies there back into the United States. 
 270 See Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that, if 
physician did not read warning provided by drug company, then plaintiff cannot 
establish that injury could have been avoided with a better warning, consequently 
destroying causation element of plaintiff’s prima facie case).  Although there are as 
yet no reported cases alleging failure to warn where the drug in question was 
purchased through an Internet pharmacy without a valid prescription, a court might 
find the same defect in causation to exist in that case.  In the absence of a duty to 
warn the end user, however, merely requiring manufacturers to give better 
alternative warnings to physicians will not change the outcome or prevent injury.  
Thus, injured consumers are left without a remedy. 
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have no legal recourse against the physician or seller of the drug.271  
In these cases, tort law in its current form fails to adequately protect 
the injured party.  By reaffirming the rule of tort law that, absent a 
clear justification to the contrary, warnings are owed to the end user 
of an unavoidably unsafe product, the proposal would protect 
consumers in two ways.  First, it would potentially decrease the 
overpromotion of drugs encouraged by current law, and make it 
more likely that a potential consumer of a drug will receive an 
effective warning.272  Second, in cases of overpromotion, or direct-to-
consumer sales, in the absence of a legally effective warning, the rule 
would provide a source of compensation for avoidable harm 
suffered.273 
2. Better Reflects Modern Medical Practice and Ethics 
In addition to enhancing the socially desirable effects of tort law, 
the rule proposed in this Article also has the benefit of reforming tort 
law to more accurately reflect the modern view of the doctor–patient 
relationship.  This section will describe how the reformed rule 
interacts with medical practice and medical ethics. 
The modern doctor–patient relationship is generally considered 
to be grounded in the autonomy of the patient.274  The physician is 
not the sole decision maker, but has the role of faciliting and making 
possible the patient’s exercise of autonomy in choosing from the 
appropriate range of therapeutic options.  In order to exercise his 
right to make decisions regarding “what shall be done with his own 
body,”275 the patient requires access to appropriate risk and benefit 
information.  Better information to the patient, from whatever 
source, translates into better health care decision making, improved 
patient compliance with treatment protocols, and, ultimately, 
 
 271 In these cases, the patient may not be able to show causation between the 
action of the physician and the use of the drug (in cases where the patient engaged 
in forum-shopping to obtain the drug, for example), or may not be able to obtain 
jurisdiction over the seller (in cases of offshore Internet pharmacies, for example). 
 272 See infra notes 223–24 and accompanying text. 
 273 The major advantage to a bright-line rule in this context is that of judicial 
economy.  In litigating the current learned intermediary rule, defendants need not 
inquire into the existence of a viable, protective doctor–patient relationship.  This 
judicial economy comes, however, at the expense of plaintiffs who are injured by 
prescription drugs obtained without the protection of a strong doctor–patient 
relationship.  It is the contention of this Article that the better approach in choosing 
a legal rule to apply is to privilege patient protection over ease of application. 
 274 See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 205, at 57-104 
 275 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting 
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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improved health outcomes.276  The rule proposed in this Article 
should have the effect of improving both the amount and the quality 
of information provided to the patient. 
Furthermore, the revision of the learned intermediary rule as a 
standard-based rather than a bright-line test means that courts can 
more easily respond to market innovations and new practices on the 
part of drug manufacturers.  Currently, courts are relatively limited in 
their ability to articulate new exceptions to the default, “no duty to 
warn the patient,” learned intermediary rule.  Part of this limitation 
springs from the common law doctrine of stare decisis; but part also 
springs from the nature of the articulated exceptions.  Under the 
Rule as currently conceived, exemptions from the duty to warn only 
the physician create categorical exceptions, which courts may fear will 
be interpreted too broadly.  For instance, the court in Perez v. Wyeth 
Laboratories,277 in articulating an exception to the Rule for direct-to-
consumer advertising, potentially opens the door for tort liability in 
every case in which a directly advertised drug is involved.  Because of 
the categorical nature of the exception to the rule, there is relatively 
little room for individualized assessments of the effect on this patient 
of the specific advertisement at issue, and of the relationship between 
that advertisement and other factors, such as the existence of a 
doctor–patient relationship that might ameliorate the effects of any 
overpromotion in the advertisement.278 
3. Balancing Tests Versus Bright Lines 
Even accepting arguendo the arguments made in favor of the 
learned intermediary rule in some instances, it does not follow that 
there should be an absolute exemption from the duty to warn the 
end user of prescription drugs.  The flexibility provided by the factors 
enumerated above279 provide sufficient opportunity for a drug 
manufacturer defendant to argue that the duty to warn in a particular 
case should run only to the prescribing physician or other learned 
intermediary.  The advantage of the proposal advanced in this Article 
 
 276 Increased information to the patient about potential adverse effects could also 
improve outcomes by making patients more vigilant with respect to drug reactions, 
leading to faster medical intervention.  See 2 WOODSIDE, supra note 39, § 14.02[2][iv] 
(discussing court’s rationale in Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961 
(E.D. Wis. 1981), for applying contraceptive exception to learned intermediary rule). 
 277 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999). 
 278 See id. at 1257 (holding that “the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply 
to the direct marketing of drugs to consumers,” but not encouraging courts to 
engage in case-by-case analysis of the effect of such marketing on the therapeutic 
decision-making process). 
 279 See supra Part III.A. 
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is that, unlike the Rule as it is currently applied, there is no resulting 
injustice in those cases in which patients are harmed by prescription 
pharmaceuticals obtained without the assistance and counsel of an 
effective learned intermediary. 
At least one other scholar has recognized the similarities 
between the learned intermediary rule and the sophisticated user 
doctrine.  Writing in 1996, Professor Richard Ausness compared the 
two doctrines and concluded: “Notwithstanding the fact that different 
relationships may exist among the various parties, there is a certain 
amount of commonality” between the paradigmatic learned 
intermediary and sophisticated user fact patterns.280  Ausness, 
however, reaches a very different conclusion than this Article, 
recommending an expansion of a bright-line, “duty-based” approach 
in a wider variety of sophisticated user cases.281 
Ausness identifies three similarities between the learned 
intermediary rule and the sophisticated user doctrine that justify 
treating the two rules similarly.  First, there is no direct contact 
between the manufacturer and the user of the product.  Second, 
there are circumstances that make it difficult for the manufacturer to 
communicate directly with the end user.  Finally, the intermediary 
has an independent legal duty to warn the end user.282  Ausness fails, 
however, to take into account the fact that modern pharmaceutical 
marketing and technological tools available to both drug 
manufacturers and potential consumers of drugs have rendered these 
factors, if not moot, then at least potentially inapplicable in particular 
situations.  It is the increased diversity of information and means of 
delivering prescription drugs that creates the necessity for the 
increased flexibility advocated in this Article. 
Courts have generally declined to extend the learned 
intermediary analysis into sophisticated user territory.283  In Hall v. 
Ashland Oil Co.,284 plaintiffs’ decedent was, coincidentally, an 
 
 280 Ausness, supra note 147, at 1225.  See also Carole A. Cheney, Comment, Not Just 
for Doctors: Applying the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to the Relationship Between Chemical 
Manufacturers, Industrial Employers, and Employees, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 562, 566 (1991) 
(advocating application of learned intermediary analysis to the relationship between 
industrial suppliers and employees of goods’ purchasers). 
 281 Ausness, supra note 147, at 1239-41. 
 282 Id., at 1225-26. 
 283 See Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn. 2004) (declining 
to apply learned intermediary rule, in favor of sophisticated user doctrine, to 
relationship between supplier a of chemicals and the injured employee of 
purchaser). 
 284 625 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Conn. 1986); see also Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 
866 F.2d 1008 (8th Cir. 1989) (refusing to apply learned intermediary rule in 
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employee of pharmaceutical manufacturer Pfizer.  The decedent had 
been injured by the industrial chemical benzene, which Pfizer had 
sold to Ashland Oil.  When plaintiffs sued Ashland for failing to warn 
them of the dangerous properties of the chemical, Ashland asserted a 
learned intermediary defense for purposes of obtaining summary 
judgment.285  The court rejected the learned intermediary defense in 
this context, reasoning that there were significant differences 
between the doctor–patient relationship and the employer–employee 
relationship.286  Since Ashland had to rely on the sophisticated user 
doctrine, with its fact-based inquiry into the reasonableness of 
reliance on the employer as an intermediary, its motion for summary 
judgment was denied.287 
The proposal set forth in this Article has the dual advantages of 
increasing the sensitivity of the tort system to the realities of the 
health care marketplace, and of being relatively easy to implement.  It 
does not require the abrogation of any existing common law 
doctrine, but merely calls for an adjustment of that doctrine to meet 
the needs of a changed market.  Nor does it depend on political will 
to enact new statutes or regulations.  Although some have called for 
expanded FDA regulation in this area,288 the FDA has in fact been 
notoriously slow to react to the new realities of the pharmaceutical 
marketplace.289 
D. Coda: A Short Note on Preemption 
A final issue facing any prescription drug tort regime is the 
relationship between state tort law and the extensive federal 
regulatory system governing the prescription drug industry.290  The 
 
employer–employee context under Missouri law); Todalen v. U.S. Chem. Co., 424 
N.W.2d 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds, Tyroll v. Private Label 
Chems., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1993) (applying the same analysis as Hall). 
 285 Hall, 625 F. Supp. at 1516. 
 286 Id. at 1519-20. 
 287 Id. at 1522.  The distinction between the learned intermediary and 
sophisticated user doctrines was not the only grounds for denial of summary 
judgment, as other issues of material fact, such as the adequacy of the warning given 
to Pfizer, existed in this case.  Id. at 1520. 
 288 See, e.g., Castagnera & Gerner, supra note 251, at 125-26 (arguing for FDA-
mandated program of disclosure by drug companies through pharmacists). 
 289 An instructive example is the FDA’s reaction to the onset of direct-to-consumer 
advertisement in the 1980s.  Although the FDA did initially request a moratorium on 
DTC advertising, it later abandoned that moratorium, claiming that existing 
regulations written with advertisement to physicians in mind were adequate to 
control DTC advertising.  Hall, Promise and Peril, supra note 101, at 4-6. 
 290 See generally Ronald W. Eades, Attempts to Federalize and Codify Tort Law, 36 TORT 
& INS. L.J. 1 (2000) (describing use of preemption analysis to create “federal 
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FDA closely regulates virtually every phase of prescription drug 
development and sale, from research and development through 
manufacture and testing to labeling and distribution.291  Further, 
federal regulation of prescription drug products is explicitly aimed at 
ensuring the safety and effectiveness of drugs sold to end users.292  
Although courts have traditionally rejected arguments that FDA 
regulation preempts failure–to–warn cases,293 such arguments have 
recently been buttressed by a few recently decided cases and signals 
from the FDA demonstrating its willingness to support such 
arguments.  In addition, the Third Restatement acknowledges 
uncertainty on this issue.294  This section briefly argues that 
preemption of tort law by FDA regulation in this area is not a good 
idea.295  A full discussion of the relationship between tort law and FDA 
regulation, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
In 1996, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,296 the United States Supreme 
Court decided that federal regulation of medical devices does not 
preempt the application of state tort law297 in cases involving injury 
caused by those devices.  Lora Lohr, the plaintiff/respondent in 
Medtronic, was the recipient of a pacemaker manufactured by 
 
defenses to state tort claims”). 
 291 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (2000 & Supp. I 
2001). 
 292 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA’S MISSION STATEMENT, at 
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/mission.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). 
 293 See 2 WOODSIDE, supra note 39, § 14.04[3][c][iii], at 14-129 to -132; Michael I. 
Krauss, Loosening the FDA’s Drug Certification Monopoly: Implications for Tort and 
Consumer Welfare, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 457, 477 (1996) (citing Allen v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 
65 (Mass. 1985)). 
 294 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 7 cmt. e. 
 295 The drafters of the Third Restatement have expressed agreement with this 
concept, in a comment to section 6.  That comment states in part: 
The doctrine of preemption based on supremacy of federal law should 
be distinguished from the proposition that compliance with statutory 
and regulatory standards satisfies that state’s requirement for product 
safety.  [Sections 6(c) and 6(d)] recognize common-law causes of 
action for defective drug design and for failure to provide reasonable 
instructions or warnings, even though the manufacturer complied with 
governmental standards. 
Id. § 6 cmt. b. 
 296 518 U.S. 470 (1996).  For an excellent in-depth analysis of the Medtronic 
decision, see generally Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad: 
Federal Preemption of Products Liability Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691 
(1997). 
 297 Although the claim in Medtronic did not involve failure-to-warn theory, but 
rather design defect theory, Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 481, the type of product liability 
claim should not have a material effect on the preemption analysis. 
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petitioners.298  When the product malfunctioned, forcing Lohr to 
undergo emergency surgery to correct the problem,299 she sought 
damages in tort under Florida law.300  The Court noted that the 
production and sale of the pacemaker device was regulated under the 
Medical Device Amendments (“MDA”) to the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”), and that the MDA expressly prohibit any 
state from “establish[ing] . . . any requirement—(1) which is different 
from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this 
chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or 
effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a 
requirement applicable to the device under [the Act].”301  The Court 
concluded that, despite this language, the plaintiff’s tort claim was 
not preempted, since state tort law did not involve a “requirement . . . 
different from, or in addition to,” the FDA requirements under the 
MDA.302 
Although Medtronic may illustrate a reluctance on the part of the 
Court to preempt state tort law actions, there are several significant 
differences between the operation of the MDA (with respect to 
medical devices) and the FDCA (with respect to prescription drugs), 
which would distinguish the Medtronic case from a potential case 
arguing preemption in the prescription drug failure-to-warn context.  
These differences also create substantial uncertainty as to the 
outcome of a future case arguing preemption in the prescription 
drug context.303  First, the FDCA, unlike the MDA, contains no 
express preemption language.304  This means that a court would have 
to rely on an implied (conflict) preemption analysis,305 rather than 
 
 298 Id. at 480. 
 299 Id. at 481. 
 300 Id. 
 301 Id. at 481-82 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 302 See Leflar & Adler, supra note 296, at 701-10 (analyzing in detail the Medtronic 
opinion).  Significantly, four of the nine justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas) were willing to conclude that state tort law 
did in fact impose an additional requirement on the manufacturer, and thus should 
have been preempted.  Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 509-11 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 303 See Eades, supra note 290, at 15 (“Surprisingly, [Medtronic] has not proven to be 
the final word on this issue . . . .”). 
 304 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2000) (expressly preempting state laws “(1) . . . 
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under [the MDA], and 
(2) which relate[] to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter 
included in a requirement applicable to the device under [the MDA”], with David G. 
Owen, Federal Preemption of Products Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV. 411, 428 (2003) 
(describing FDCA’s lack of an express preemption clause). 
 305 See Leflar & Adler, supra note 296, at 695 (discussing the distinction between 
conflict and field preemption and concluding that field preemption is virtually 
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express preemption analysis, which would make it more difficult for a 
defendant to claim preemption.  Second, the device at issue in 
Medtronic had not been rigorously evaluated by the FDA, but was 
covered under the “grandfather clause” provisions of the MDA.306  
Intended as a temporary pro-competitive measure during the 
implementation of the MDA, the grandfather clause, which allows the 
marketing of medical devices substantially equivalent to a pre-MDA 
device without pre-authorization by the FDA, has become the primary 
route to market for new medical devices.307  This stands in sharp 
contrast to the extensive substantive FDA scrutiny of new prescription 
drugs.308  It is possible that the comparatively heightened FDA 
scrutiny of new prescription drugs would lead the Court to conclude 
that it is reasonable to substitute the FDA scrutiny for state tort law 
regulation with respect to the drug’s safety. 
Moreover, two cases decided since Medtronic, although not 
overruling Medtronic, are arguably more pro-preemption, and could 
be used to construct a case for FDA preemption of state law 
prescription drug claims.309  In 2000, the Court held that common law 
tort claims were preempted by provisions of the National Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,310 which required passive restraints 
in automobiles.311  Although the Court held that the state law claims 
were not expressly preempted by the statute’s language,312 the tort 
claim was implicitly preempted because of “actual conflict” between 
tort standards and the passive restraint regulations written by the 
Department of Transportation (“DOT”).313  The Court reasoned that 
because DOT regulations explicitly sought to encourage a variety of 
passive restraint mechanisms, phased in over time, the plaintiff’s 
allegations that Honda’s failure to install one particular sort of 
passive restraint (airbags) would undermine that regulatory 
 
impossible to argue in the products liability context). 
 306 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477-78. 
 307 Id. at 479 (finding that 80% of new devices are deemed “substantially 
equivalent” to a device already on the market and thus receive no independent FDA 
review for safety and efficacy). 
 308 See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription 
Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 
RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 890-930 (1996) (detailing extensive FDA review process that 
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 309 For a brief sketch of the pro-preemption analysis contained in this section, see 
generally James Dabney Miller, Blocking Bad Claims, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 10, 2003, at 31. 
 310 Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966), repealed by Pub. L. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 
Stat. 1379 (1994) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (2000)). 
 311 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874-86 (2000). 
 312 Id. at 867-68. 
 313 Id. at 874-75. 
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objective.314 
In 2001, the Court revisited the implied preemption debate, 
again in the context of the MDA.  In Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal 
Committee,315 tort plaintiffs sought to hold the manufacturer of bone 
screws liable for injuries allegedly caused by those products.  Like the 
pacemaker in Medtronic, bone screws are devices which would be 
required to undergo full pre-marketing approval by the FDA, but for 
the substantial equivalence exception.316  Unlike Medtronic, the 
plaintiffs in Buckman alleged that the manufacturer of the device 
made false statements to the FDA in order to obtain a finding of 
substantial equivalence and avoid substantive FDA review of the 
device.317  Reasoning that the FDCA already provided statutory 
procedures for policing and responding to fraudulent applications, 
the Court held that imposition of state tort law scrutiny of a 
manufacturer’s FDA filings would necessarily conflict with those 
procedures, and was thus impliedly, even though not expressly, 
preempted.318 
The Court also addressed the relationship between Medtronic 
and Buckman, since the plaintiffs in Buckman argued that Medtronic 
saved their tort claim from preemption.319  The Court concluded: 
[T]he Medtronic claims arose from the manufacturer’s failure to 
use reasonable care in the production of the product, not solely 
from the violation of FDCA requirements. . . .  Thus, although 
Medtronic can be read to allow certain state-law causes of action 
that parallel federal safety requirements, it does not and cannot 
stand for the proposition that any violation of the FDCA will 
support a state-law claim.320 
The issue for tort defendants who seek to assert federal 
preemption of failure-to-warn claims involving prescription drugs will 
thus be the evolving definitional issue of which state law actions 
“parallel federal safety requirements.”321  Given that state-law failure-
to-warn actions implicate the traditional police powers of the State to 
ensure the safety of its citizens,322 Buckman should not be read as 
dictating preemption of failure-to-warn claims involving prescription 
 
 314 Id. at 882-83. 
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drugs, notwithstanding the Court’s characterization of the claim in 
Buckman as “policing fraud against federal agencies,”323 which gave 
rise to “no presumption against pre-emption.”324 
The current Administration is actively pursuing federal 
preemption of state tort law in the drug and device context.325  
Current results in the courts are mixed.  In the Ninth Circuit case of 
Motus v. Pfizer,326 plaintiff’s decedent committed suicide after being 
prescribed the antidepressant drug Zoloft, manufactured by Pfizer.327  
The plaintiff did not allege that Pfizer should have warned the 
patient directly, but alleged that the warning provided to the 
prescribing physician was inadequate.328  Pfizer responded by arguing 
that the warning given to the physician complied with FDA 
requirements, and that plaintiff’s state law tort claim of its inadequacy 
should be preempted.329  The FDA filed an amicus brief with the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in support of preemption.330  The 
court, however, did not reach the preemption issue, holding instead 
that, since decedent’s physician did not read or rely on Pfizer’s 
warning, the inadequacy of that warning cannot have been the legal 
cause of plaintiff’s injuries under controlling California law.331 
The FDA had more success in the Third Circuit case of Horn v. 
Thoratec Corp.332  In that case, plaintiff’s decedent died after an alleged 
malfunction of a heart pump manufactured by defendant.  Plaintiff 
sued on both design defect and failure-to-warn theories, but the 
district court granted Thoratec’s motion for summary judgment on 
the grounds that “‘any [state law] judgment that the [pump] was 
unsafe or otherwise substandard would be in direct conflict [with] . . . 
the FDA’s determination that the product was suitable for use.’”333  
 
 323 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347. 
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 327 Id. at 660. 
 328 Id. 
 329 Brief for Appellee Pfizer Inc. at 62, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Nos. 02-55372 & 02-55498), available at 2002 WL 32303085.. 
 330 Brief for Amicus Curiae United States, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372 & 02-55498), available at 2002 WL 32303084. 
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The Third Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment, 
distinguishing Medtronic on the grounds that the pump at issue in 
Horn had been approved by the FDA after a full review of the device, 
rather than under the limited “substantial equivalence” approval 
granted to the device in Medtronic.334  The court gave substantial 
deference to the FDA’s new position in favor of preemption.335 
The preemption issue is an important aspect of failure to warn 
in the prescription drug context,336 and the FDA’s position in the 
Motus case, coupled with the slim margin in the Medtronic opinion, 
signals that future failure-to-warn claims will be contested on 
preemption grounds.  Because of the importance and historical 
prevalence of the state police power in this context,337 and because of 
the FDA’s failure to act to ensure adequate warnings in the past,338 I 
continue to believe that preemption is not appropriate in state 
failure-to-warn claims involving prescription drugs.339  The majority 
position among state and federal courts is still opposed to 
preemption in this context,340 and, subject to contrary holdings in the 
future, this Article assumes that such broad preemption is 
inappropriate.341 
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CONCLUSION 
The law must reflect commercial reality.342  Unfortunately, the 
pace of change in the health care marketplace over the past decade 
has made it difficult for the common law, a fundamentally 
conservative institution, to keep up with new developments.  While 
the modifications to the learned intermediary rule proposed in this 
Article will make the Rule’s application somewhat more complex, 
they have the advantage of realigning the Rule with the practices of 
the health care marketplace, and thus enabling the tripartite 
functions of the tort system—compensation, deterrence, and cost 
allocation—to operate more efficiently.  The marketplace for health 
care services, including prescription pharmaceuticals, has evolved 
beyond the point where a simple set of categorical exceptions to the 
learned intermediary rule can effectively reflect the needs of 
consumers of prescription drugs. 
Where an effective intermediary exists, such as where a drug is 
prescribed and administered within the context of a robust 
physician–patient relationship, the purposes of tort law are best 
served by applying the Rule to safeguard the drug manufacturer from 
liability.  We should recognize, however, that the modern health care 
market has created several opportunities for a consumer to obtain 
prescription drugs outside of such a relationship—situations that 
diminish the role of the physician as educator and undermine the 
doctor/patient relationship.  Absent an effective intermediary, the 
learned intermediary rule, while protecting the drug manufacturer, 
fails to adequately protect the drug consumer.  Furthermore, the 
learned intermediary rule insulates drug manufacturers from the 
incentives the tort system provides to take reasonable steps to ensure 
that adequate warnings are provided to all users of a drug.  By 
reimagining the learned intermediary rule as a fact-based balancing 
of interests, rather than a bright-line exemption from the usual duty 
to warn a product’s end user, tort law can balance the interests of 
drug manufacturers with those of consumers, and create incentives to 
further reduce the incidence of injuries due to misuse of prescription 
drugs. 
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